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To regulate and police the U.S. securities markets in an era of globalization,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) has developed
new approaches for obtaining a wide variety of information from abroad. The
SEC's attempts in the early 1980s to secure foreign-based evidence in several
notorious insider trading cases often were frustrated by the assertion of foreign
secrecy laws. Although the federal courts assisted the SEC by compelling the
production of the foreign-based information, that unilateral approach was time-
consuming and expensive. In part because of its success in U.S. courts, the
SEC was able to begin a dialogue with foreign securities officials and other law
enforcement authorities, and it developed informal case-by-case understandings
that facilitated the production of information from other countries.
The ad hoc nature of a case-by-case approach highlighted the need for more
formal mechanisms that would foster international cooperation and provide
greater assurance of the availability of assistance. This article describes the impor-
tance of bilateral and multilateral agreements the SEC has used to obtain foreign-
based information and documents, and the SEC's experience with those mecha-
nisms. Because those mechanisms were not specifically tailored to the SEC's
investigation and litigation needs and did not provide optimal assistance, the SEC
initiated regulator-to-regulator discussions that resulted in the SEC's own formal
understandings.
On November 15, 1988, the SEC released a Policy Statement on Regulation
of International Securities Markets.246 The Policy Statement, approved unani-
mously by the Commission, identifies areas of regulatory concern presented by
the continued internationalization of the securities markets and sets forth princi-
ples and goals central to achieving a truly global market system. In the Policy
246. 53 Fed. Reg. 46,963 (Nov. 21, 1988).
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Statement the SEC first articulated an integrated approach to addressing interna-
tionalization.
The SEC has maintained an active leadership role in developing international
understandings designed to enhance cooperation among securities regulators. The
SEC also has worked, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, and within international
organizations, to develop a coherent and effective approach to coordinating en-
forcement matters, such as how to address complex frauds. Moreover, in connec-
tion with its efforts to provide assistance to foreign authorities, the SEC recom-
mended, and Congress enacted, legislation that authorizes the SEC to conduct
investigations on behalf of foreign securities authorities, using subpoena authority
if necessary.247
I. Bilateral Treaties for the Production of Evidence
The United States has entered into treaties with many countries to provide
mutual assistance in criminal matters. As of March 15, 1995, thirteen Treaties
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLAT) were in force.2 48 Eleven
MLATs have been signed but are not yet effective because they have not been
ratified by the U.S. Senate or the appropriate foreign legislative body, or both.249
The SEC has used these "criminal" treaties because U.S. federal securities laws
are both civil and criminal in nature.25°
The SEC has ensured that these agreements specifically cover securities law
offenses and has used the agreements in SEC investigations to obtain information
and documents to assist it in determining whether U.S. federal securities laws
have been violated. The SEC also has used information and documents obtained
under the treaties as evidence in actions the SEC filed in U.S. federal courts
against persons accused of violating federal securities laws. The following sec-
tions describe several of the treaties currently in effect.
247. Pub. L. No. 100-704 (signed into law on Nov. 19, 1988).
248. The 13 MLATs (effective dates noted in parentheses) are with the following countries:
Argentina (Feb. 9, 1993); Bahamas (July 18, 1990); Canada (Jan. 24, 1990); Cayman Islands
(Mar. 19, 1990-extended by diplomatic note to Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands and the
Turks and Caicos Islands on Nov. 9, 1990, and to Montserrat on Apr. 26, 1991); Italy
(Nov. 13, 1985); Mexico (May 3, 1991); Morocco (June 23, 1993); The Netherlands (Sept. 15,
1983); Spain (June 30, 1993); Switzerland (Jan. 23, 1977); Thailand (June 10, 1993); Turkey
(Jan. 1, 1981); and Uruguay (Apr. 14, 1994).
249. The nonratified MLATs are as follows (dates of signing given in parentheses): Austria
(Mar. 2, 1995); Organization of American States (OAS) MLAT and Protocol on Assistance in
Tax Cases (Jan. 10, 1995); Hungary (Dec. 1, 1994); Philippines (Nov. 13, 1994); United Kingdom
(Jan. 6, 1994); South Korea (Nov. 23, 1993); Panama (Apr. 11, 1991); Nigeria (Sept. 9, 1989);
Jamaica (July 7, 1989); Belgium (Jan. 28, 1988); and Colombia (Aug. 20, 1980).
250. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 27, "Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district
wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred."
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A. TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND
The Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the Swiss Con-
federation and the United States 25' (Swiss Treaty) was the first mutual assistance
treaty of its kind to which the United States was a party. It "provides for broad
assistance in . . . criminal matters . . . includ[ing] assistance in locating wit-
nesses, obtaining statements and testimony of witnesses, production and authenti-
cation of business records, and service of judicial or administrative docu-
ments." 252 Six exchanges of letters interpreting certain language in its provisions
supplement the Swiss Treaty.
The Swiss Treaty, which is available only to the governments of the United
States and Switzerland,253 is employed either during an investigation or after
initiation of a proceeding. Except for cases of organized crime, the offenses
investigated must meet a dual criminality standard, that is, they must be criminal
in nature in both the requesting and the executing states. Although the Swiss
Treaty applies to a full range of matters that meet the dual criminality requirement,
it does not cover customs, tax, and antitrust law.254 The SEC, an administrative
agency, may use the Swiss Treaty if the SEC's request pertains to an investigation
of conduct that might be dealt with in a criminal proceeding, such as insider
trading. The Swiss Treaty, however, is not the exclusive means for obtaining
records maintained or generated in Switzerland.255
1. Operation of the Swiss Treaty
Article 3 of the Swiss Treaty provides that the state granting assistance may
refuse such assistance to the extent the request is likely to "prejudice its sover-
eignty, security or similar essential interests. " Although banking secrecy is con-
sidered an essential Swiss interest, unless the person about whom the information
is requested is not connected with the offense, or unless the secret itself is of
special importance to the Swiss economy, assistance is generally granted under
the Swiss Treaty. Assistance may be refused, however, if the request is made
for the purpose of prosecuting a person for acts of which the person already has
been acquitted in the requested state.
Article 4 provides that compulsory measures are applied if the request's crimi-
nal offense is an offense in both the United States and Switzerland, and if the
offense described is among the thirty-five serious crimes denoted in the annex
to the Swiss Treaty. Article 5 provides that information received pursuant to the
251. Done May 25, 1973 (effective 1977), U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss Treaty].
252. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, S. EXEC. F., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 18, 1976).
253. See Swiss Treaty, supra note 251, arts. 1, 2.
254. Id. art. 2.
255. See In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting a witness's contention
that the Swiss Treaty provides the exclusive means for obtaining company records that were maintained
or generated in Switzerland).
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Swiss Treaty, unless otherwise agreed to by diplomatic note, 6 must be used as
evidence in a criminal proceeding before it can be introduced in a civil proceeding.
Article 5 is the product of the tension that arose from the U.S. position that
information furnished under the Swiss Treaty should be available for all uses,
and the Swiss view that information gained under the Swiss Treaty should be
used solely for the purpose for which it was furnished. The article accepts the
Swiss view regarding limitations on use, with certain exceptions allowing for
further use of the information, but only after the state providing the information
is advised of the intended use, and where the same crimes are involved. Under
article 5, governmental authorities may use the requested information in proceed-
ings concerning civil damages or in any continuing criminal investigation covered
by the Swiss Treaty, provided that such information is not introduced into evi-
dence.
In the exchange of interpretive letters that accompanied the Swiss Treaty, the
parties agreed that article 5 is not "intended to restrict the use of information
which has become public any more than the use of information which has become
public would be restricted in the requested State.' 257 In addition, the parties
agreed that the limitations of article 5 constituted solely an agreement between
governments, and could not be used by any person to suppress or exclude any
evidence gained under the Swiss Treaty.
Article 8 provides that the designated central authorities, the U.S. Department
of Justice and the Swiss Department of Justice and Policy, will process the re-
quests. If the U.S. central authority receives a request, and the U.S. Justice
Department determines that the Swiss Treaty applies, the Justice Department
can execute the request without any further procedures.2 58 The procedure in
Switzerland differs because, concurrent with the ratification of the Swiss Treaty,
the Swiss passed additional implementing legislation that created specific rights
of appeal for individuals who wish to oppose execution of U.S. treaty requests.
Although this legislation does not bar the ultimate execution of the request, it
introduces significant time delays to the Swiss Treaty request process.
2. Challenges to Use of the Swiss Treaty
Despite express language in the Swiss Treaty barring its use as a basis for
nongovernmental motions to suppress or exclude evidence obtained under the
treaty, criminal defendants have challenged such evidence as a violation of the
Swiss Treaty. The courts have rejected those challenges because article 37(A)
of the Swiss Treaty expressly provides that private parties have no standing to
256. See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
257. President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Treaty with the Swiss Confederation on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Exchanges of Interpretive Letters, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
57-118 (1976).
258. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-1782 (1988).
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raise the issue.259 The courts also have found the use of such evidence to be
consistent with fairness and due process, since defendants retain the right to
challenge the value of the evidence.26°
In Barr v. United States Department of Justice2 61 the Second Circuit rejected
a challenge to a freeze of assets by the Swiss Government pursuant to a request
to freeze assets under the Swiss Treaty. The court held that the freeze of assets did
not violate the Swiss Treaty and did not deprive the appellant of his constitutional
rights.262 In denying Barr's request for an injunction directing the United States
to withdraw its treaty request, the court noted that although the Swiss Treaty
does not specifically list the freeze of assets of a criminal defendant as an available
measure in the Swiss Treaty, both the U.S. and Swiss Governments "believe
that such a freeze is one of the mutual assistance measures embraced by the
Treaty." 263 The court concluded that this understanding was entitled to deference,
citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.2 6
3. Experience under the Swiss Treaty in Insider Trading Cases
Notwithstanding the very high threshold for SEC requests caused by the dual
criminality standard and the absence of specific securities laws in Switzerland
until 1995 (except for its insider trading law, described below), the SEC has
been successful in using the Swiss Treaty in some of its most serious cases. Swiss
criminal law contains three specific antifraud provisions that arguably provide
protection similar to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act). Although the Swiss provisions may be more restrictive
than the U.S. common law concerning insider trading, they have been relied
upon as a basis for granting treaty requests in matters involving possible trading
by a person while in possession of material nonpublic information, in violation
of U.S. securities laws. Switzerland's insider trading law, which went into effect
on July 1, 1988, provides substantial coverage for the fact situations the SEC
has encountered involving trading through Swiss banks.
In 1982, when the SEC made its first request under the Swiss Treaty in SEC
v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call Options for
the Common Stock of Santa Fe International Corp.2 65 (the Santa Fe case), dis-
cussed below, no insider trading law existed in Switzerland. Nevertheless, Swit-
zerland granted the SEC's request and provided evidence important to the outcome
of the case. An exchange of opinions between the governments of the United
259. See United States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075
(1984); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1029 (2d Cir. 1985).
260. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d at 1030-33.
261. 819 F.2d 25 (2d Cir, 1987).
262. Id. at 28.
263. Id.
264. Id. (citing to art. 31(3)(6) (1969)).
265. No. 81 Civ. 6553 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1986), aff'd, 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1987).
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States and Switzerland, along with the Swiss Federal Court's opinion in Santa
Fe and other cases, established that the SEC could request and receive assistance
from Switzerland in the area of insider trading.
a. The Santa Fe Case
After entry of a preliminary injunction in the Santa Fe case, 266 the SEC sought
to learn the identities of certain account holders (the unknown purchasers) who
had directed purchases of Santa Fe stock and options through Swiss banks just
prior to the announcement of a merger. The banks refused to answer the SEC's
questions on the ground that to do so would violate Swiss bank secrecy laws.
On March 22, 1982, the SEC formally submitted a request for assistance under
the Swiss Treaty to the government of Switzerland.
The unknown purchasers, using Swiss procedures, opposed cooperation under
the Treaty, and on January 26, 1983, the Swiss Federal Court denied the SEC's
request. 26' The court accepted the facts as stated in the SEC's request and focused
on whether the allegations constituted a prima facie case of an offense for which
assistance could be granted under the Swiss Treaty. The Swiss Federal Court
held that SEC requests could properly be processed under article 1 of the Swiss
Treaty, even though the SEC did not have the authority to prosecute them crimi-
nally. The court concluded that the SEC's requests were in furtherance of an
investigation in advance of a possible criminal referral, based on the criminal
penalties available under U.S. securities laws and the SEC's authority to refer
a case for criminal prosecution.
The Swiss court concluded, however, that the SEC had failed to establish
the requisite violations of Swiss law. The court further held that the facts as
demonstrated in the SEC's request did not parallel the three Swiss criminal statutes
that might relate to insider trading: harm to a person owed a contractual or legal
obligation; fraud to procure personal gain by causing others to harm themselves;
or abuse of a business secret by a party obligated to honor it.
The court noted that a person aware of secret information, who uses it to his
or her advantage without revealing it to a third party, may not be guilty of violation
of a business secret, since the secret had not been revealed and no profit was
realized from the revelation. The court concluded that although the trading in
the Santa Fe case could violate Swiss law, the court could not make the requisite
determination of dual criminality because the SEC was unable to allege whether
the traders were insiders or tippees. The opinion left open an avenue for a second
request, based upon the court's analysis that although an insider could trade while
in possession of nonpublic information, a tippee who purchased stock would
violate Swiss law. Accordingly, on July 27, 1983, the SEC alleged additional
facts in support of its request for assistance under the Swiss Treaty.
266. Id.
267. 22 I.L.M. 785 (1983).
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On May 16, 1984, after all appeals were exhausted by the defendants, the Swiss
Federal Court, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the new request adequately
demonstrated that the traders were tippees, not insiders.268 Consequently, it
granted the SEC's request, and the SEC finally learned the identities of the
unknown purchasers. Just after those names were revealed, however, the purchas-
ers appealed the ruling to prevent further disclosure of documents or testimony.
That appeal to the Swiss Consultative Commission, the Swiss Justice Minister,
and ultimately the Swiss Federal Council, took nine additional months before
the issue finally was resolved in favor of the SEC. The SEC ultimately received
documents responsive to its request, two years after its original inquiry. On
February 26, 1986, all remaining defendants agreed to settle the SEC's action
and disgorge $7.8 million in profits. Six of the eight defendants consented to
the entry of final judgments of permanent injunction restricting each from viola-
tions of the Exchange Act. The remaining two defendants agreed to disgorge
their profits from the transactions at issue.
Since the Santa Fe case, the Swiss Federal Court has affirmed on numerous
occasions the SEC's ability to use the Swiss Treaty for investigations involving
insider trading and other offenses involving Section 10(b) fraud.
b. SEC v. Musella
2 69
SEC v. Musella is another example of the SEC's use of the Swiss Treaty for
purposes of discovery in a suit involving insider trading. In connection with a
treaty request in that matter, the Swiss Federal Court, on appeal from the Federal
Office for Police Matters (FOPM), in an unpublished opinion, upheld the grant
of access as requested by the SEC. It reasoned, in part, that "documents . . .
[that are deposited with a Swiss broker] in Switzerland quite obviously are subject
to Swiss civil law and as such are the property of the bank or financial institution
which either has issued or received same." 270 The Federal Court also observed
that, in its estimation, the tipper in an insider trading case violates business
secrecy within the meaning of the Swiss Penal Code, and thus tippers are also
subject to Swiss criminal liability.
c. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana271 (the St. Joe case)
On October 22, 1986, in connection with the St. Joe case, the Swiss Federal
Court orally considered a request for information by the SEC relating to trading
in the securities of St. Joe Minerals Corporation by Giuseppe Tome, an Italian
national residing in Switzerland, and Lombardfin S.p.a., a U.S. registered broker-
dealer located in Italy. The trading in question occurred just prior to the announce-
268. Unpublished, Swiss Federal Court, A 1/84 (May 16, 1984).
269. No. 83 Civ. 342 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y.), [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,536 (S.D.N.Y 1989).
270. Id.
271. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y 1981).
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ment of a tender offer by Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons for all the outstanding
shares of St. Joe. The Federal Court summarily dismissed the petitions to deny
assistance, and confirmed that the Swiss Treaty applied to requests by the SEC
when the dual criminality standard was met.
In its written opinion, the Federal Court elaborated upon prior decisions, hold-
ing that a Swiss court should accept as true the facts alleged in a request for
mutual assistance. When such facts created a reasonable suspicion that criminal
conduct occurred, the Swiss Treaty should provide assistance. The court further
held that third parties who were uninvolved in the crimes alleged in a treaty
request could be required to give evidence when it could be shown that such
third parties had an actual bond to the facts alleged in the request.
The court noted that information obtained under the Swiss Treaty could be
used both in criminal proceedings in the United States as well as in ancillary
administrative proceedings, such as SEC actions seeking injunctions and dis-
gorgement. The court stated, however, that use of the information in an SEC
proceeding needed to be confirmed through an exchange of diplomatic notes.
Finally, the court held that a Swiss court, upon request, had the authority under
the Swiss Treaty to grant an order to preserve the status quo, blocking the removal
of any allegedly ill-gotten gains from accounts in Switzerland.
d. In the Matters of X against Decisions of the FOPM
In two unpublished decisions, In the Matters of X Against Decisions of the
FOPM,272 regarding a similar request for assistance in an SEC insider trading investi-
gation, the Swiss Federal Court rejected challenges to the SEC's request for assistance
under the Swiss Treaty. The request sought information and documents from a Swiss
financial institution about transactions in several securities. The court reiterated that
judicial assistance could be rendered in insider trading cases in which the insider
passed confidential information to a third party, since such conduct could be consid-
ered a betrayal of business secrets in violation of the Swiss Penal Code. The court
concluded that the importance of the matter justified the use of coercive measures
in the execution of the request, and it rejected the argument that purely practical
difficulties, such as the amount of work and the financial burden to be incurred in
responding to the request, were grounds for denying the request. The court noted
that extra work was involved with any such request for judicial assistance.
4. Use of the Swiss Treaty in Market Manipulation
and Failure to Register Cases
a. The Matter of X 27 3
On March 18, 1985, the Swiss Federal Court considered and allowed an SEC
treaty request in The Matter of X. The SEC's investigation concerned the issuance
272. Unpublished, Swiss Federal Court, A 408/1986/TS (Jan. 12, 1987); Unpublished, Swiss
Federal Court, A 57/1987/Bd (Apr. 15, 1987).
273. Unpublished, Swiss Federal Court, A 473/84/Ct (Mar. 18, 1985).
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and distribution of unauthorized and unregistered securities by several individu-
als, resulting in proceeds to the individuals in excess of $3 million. The parties
challenging the SEC's treaty request contended that they acted in good faith when
they issued the securities. The court noted that Swiss authorities were bound by
the fact representations in the request, provided that such representations did not
contain obvious mistakes, omissions, or contradictions. The court refused to be
drawn into an evaluation of the merits of the underlying U.S. case, drawing a
comparison to extradition, and stating that a request for judicial assistance merely
must show that a criminal act may have occurred. Similarly, the court refused
to honor a claim for business confidentiality, reasoning that because such a defense
is not available against Swiss authorities when a crime has occurred, it similarly
should not be available where a foreign request is made for judicial assistance.
Finally, the court ruled that the Swiss Treaty's requirement that a criminal pro-
ceeding exist prior to the grant of assistance would be met if Swiss authorities
knew that a criminal investigation of the matter would be initiated.
b. In the Matter of X against Decision of May 16, 1986, of the FOPM274
In this matter the SEC obtained information pursuant to the Swiss Treaty in
an investigation involving the parking of securities. The SEC's request alleged
that by engaging in a scheme to park the shares of a company in an initial public
offering, and coordinating the timing of the purchase and sale of the shares, the
subject brokerage firm restricted the supply of the shares offered on the market
and produced a rise in the price of the shares. The SEC sought information about
certain Swiss bank accounts whose holders the SEC suspected may have colluded
in the scheme.
The Swiss Federal Court rejected the account holder's request to vacate the
decision of the FOPM to grant the treaty request. The court rejected each argument
raised by the account holder, and reiterated that a Swiss authority does not have
to rule on the veracity of the facts alleged in the request. The court noted that
because the U.S. investigation was in its preliminary stages, the request could
be founded on suspicions. The court held that it was not necessary for the affected
party (here, the account holder) to have participated in the alleged criminal con-
duct, and that in this regard, the Swiss authorities were bound by the facts alleged
in the request. The court also held that the dual criminality requirement was met,
concluding that the facts set forth in the request satisfied the objective conditions
of the relevant Swiss Criminal Code violations of fraud and disloyal management.
The court rejected the account holder's final objection, concluding that the re-
quested measures of assistance were not disproportionate and that the measures
were indispensable for discovering the requested information.
274. Unpublished, Swiss Federal Court, A 414/86 (May 12, 1987).
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5. Use of Swiss Treaty in Complex Matters
a. SEC v. Arnold Kimmes
275
In August 1989 the SEC brought this action against Thomas Quinn, other
individuals, and two corporations in connection with large-scale securities fraud
in the marketing and sale of low-priced securities (so-called penny stocks). At
approximately the same time, the SEC requested under the Swiss Treaty the
assistance of Swiss authorities in obtaining documents relating to, in part, accounts
maintained at various banks located in Switzerland by Quinn and others. Swiss
authorities provided the SEC with a large volume of documents in response to
the request, and their assistance was extremely useful to the SEC's action. Quinn
was permanently enjoined, and his assets were frozen pursuant to court order.276
b. Use of Experts
In a February 1992 unpublished opinion, the Swiss Federal Court rejected an
appeal of an FOPM order for the provision of legal assistance to the SEC.277 To
facilitate the investigation, the SEC and FOPM agreed to retain experts to assist
the Swiss magistrate in conducting an investigation of a complex (and document
intensive) case in Switzerland on behalf of the SEC. The experts' work was to
include issuing subpoenas, taking testimony, attending meetings with representa-
tives of the SEC and the Swiss Government, and providing other assistance to
the examining magistrate. Among other things, the appellants objected to the
use of the experts to review and select important documents, and to the presence
of SEC representatives at the interrogation of witnesses.
The court rejected the appellants' arguments that instructions to the experts
were too vague and that the experts effectively functioned as SEC assistants.
The court also concluded that it was useful for SEC representatives to be present
at the interrogation of witnesses. Nevertheless, it was careful to note that, absent
a special application, such representatives could not be present during the experts'
review and selection of documents, as this might violate the Swiss Cbermassverbot
(law prohibiting an excess grant of authority). To the authors' knowledge, this
is the first time a Swiss federal court addressed these issues. The outcome is
encouraging for the quality of future assistance available under the Swiss Treaty.
c. Insider Trading Regarding Company Earnings
In a December 1992 opinion the Swiss Federal Court rejected the appeal of an
FOPM order to provide legal assistance to the SEC in a matter involving the alleged
275. No. 89 C 5942, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 888 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1995).
276. On June 21, 1993, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's permanent injunction
against Quinn and freeze of Quinn's assets [note: the 1989 preliminary injunction (PI) became perma-
nent when the district court judge merged the PI into a final judgment against Quinn in granting the
Commission's unopposed motion for summary judgment]. SEC v. Quinn, No. 92 Civ. 2657 (7th
Cir. June 21, 1993).
277. Unpublished, Swiss Federal Court, IA. 122/1991/Kr (Feb. 3, 1992).
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illegal use of insider information concerning a 42 percent drop in a company's earn-
ings. 27" The court upheld the assistance, concluding that the dual criminality re-
quirement of the Swiss Treaty was satisfied in accordance with article 162 of the
Swiss Criminal Code. Article 162 provides that "whoever shall reveal an industrial
or commercial secret that he had the obligation to keep by law or by contract
. . .and whoever shall draw profit from such a relevation. . . shall be punished."
The Federal Court stated that "within the meaning of this provision, a secret is any
particular knowledge that is not known or easily accessible to the public and that
its owner has a legitimate interest in keeping secret," and that "it is obvious that
a third person who has drawn profit from this information shall be punishable under
article 162 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code." The court noted, however, that the
requirements of article 162 would not be met if insiders used the information for
their own benefit and did not provide it to third persons. The court then stated that
the so-called noninsiders or third persons would probably include, within their
scope, the "managers and directors of a legal person," thus including within the
scope of article 162 persons normally considered insiders.
The court also concluded that the law prohibiting the use of insider information,
article 161 of the Swiss Criminal Code, was not applicable to the facts of the
case. The court noted that paragraph 3 of the article defines the term "confidential
facts" (that is, insider information) as including the "imminent issue of new
shares, a corporate merger or an analogous case of similar importance." After
reviewing the legislative history of the article and paragraph 3 thereunder, the
court concluded that knowledge of decreased earnings was not the kind of confi-
dential fact contemplated by article 161.
This case also is significant because unlike the holding in the Santa Fe case,
the Swiss court granted assistance even though the Treaty request did not articulate
violations of the relevant Criminal Code provision. Under the Swiss Treaty, legal
assistance may be granted whenever there is a founded suspicion of a crime under
Swiss law. In Santa Fe, the court concluded that it could not make the requisite
determination of dual criminality because the SEC had been unable to allege
whether the traders were insiders or tippees, forcing the SEC to allege additional
facts.279 In contrast, the court stated in the December 1992 opinion under discus-
sion that the requirement of
founded suspicion ... does not imply that the requesting party has the obligation to
prove commission of a crime, but merely the obligation to demonstrate sufficiently the
circumstances on which its suspicions are founded in order to permit the party to which
the request has been made to distinguish the request from an inadmissible request geared
to indiscriminate seeking of evidence.
Furthermore, the court implicitly recognized the right of SEC personnel to attend
hearings and the taking of testimony in Switzerland pursuant to a treaty request.
278. Unpublished, Swiss Federal Court, IA.120/1992 (Dec. 21, 1992).
279. See case cited supra note 265.
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SEC personnel cannot be present during the examination of documents that may
not be relevant to the SEC's inquiry or that would not be relevant to a violation
of the Swiss Criminal Code provisions that serve to satisfy the dual criminality
requirement. Only the Swiss magistrate may ask questions during the hearing.
6. Recovery of Assets under the Swiss Treaty
In SEC v. Eurobond Exchange, Ltd. ,2so the SEC alleged, among other things,
that more than $1 million of unregistered securities had been sold unlawfully to
the public. The proceeds from the fraudulent sales were frozen in Switzerland
in connection with a request for assistance under the Swiss Treaty. The SEC
obtained a final judgment against Gerald Rogers and others who had sold the
securities, and an order requiring that the proceeds from the sales be transferred
to a court appointed receiver for return to defrauded investors. 28 ' Although the
Swiss Treaty does not cover the return of assets to defrauded investors (only assets
belonging to the requesting state are covered), a Swiss magistrate determined that
the proceeds frozen in the Eurobond case could be returned to U.S. investors
pursuant to Article 74 of the Swiss Federal Law on International Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters of March 20, 1981.2s2
7. Further Undertakings Pursuant to the Swiss Treaty
a. The Diplomatic Notes
i. 1987. During the August 1982 negotiations between the United States
and Switzerland concerning the Memorandum of Understanding Between the
United States and Switzerland (Swiss MOU), 28 3 the United States and Switzerland
agreed that under certain circumstances the Swiss Treaty could be used to provide
assistance in SEC investigations relating to serious violations of U.S. securities
laws. The principal issue concerned the Swiss Treaty's requirement that before
evidence from entities such as Swiss banks can be provided under the Swiss
Treaty, a showing must be made that the alleged offense would be a violation
of the criminal laws of both the United States and Switzerland. The two countries
agreed that because U.S. securities laws have both criminal and civil application,
the SEC could use the Swiss Treaty to request assistance for use in SEC investiga-
tions, where the conduct involved was serious enough that, if proven, a referral
280. Civil Case No. 90-378 DT (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, SEC v. Eurobond Exchange, Ltd., 13 F.3d
1334 (9th Cir. 1994).
281. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the investment program was an investment contract
subject to the federal securities laws. The Ninth Circuit also rejected appellant's argument that the
Treaty for Extradition of Criminals Between the United States and Switzerland (May 4, 1990) barred
the SEC's civil action. The court based its decision on the defendant-appellant's failure to raise
timely a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and the Swiss Government's representation that the
Rule of Specialty did not apply to the subject civil action.
282. Unpublished, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney IV, Canton of Zurich, Reg. No. 731/92
(July 11, 1992) (Order).
283. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
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of the matter for criminal prosecution could be made. Although this understanding
solved the SEC's initial problem of obtaining information at the investigatory
stage, the Swiss Treaty limited use of such evidence to criminal cases or cases
"ancillary" thereto.
To ensure that the SEC would not be prevented from using information received
under the Swiss Treaty in insider trading cases, in August 1982 the two govern-
ments agreed that such SEC cases would be considered ancillary to criminal
proceedings. For a matter to be officially considered ancillary, however, the
Swiss Treaty requires that diplomatic notes be exchanged by the parties. After
more than four years of negotiations, diplomatic notes were exchanged on Novem-
ber 10, 1987.
The diplomatic notes ensured that, notwithstanding that the Swiss MOU would
go out of effect when insider trading became expressly illegal in Switzerland,
the SEC could still obtain and use information under the Swiss Treaty in insider
trading cases.
ii. 1993. On November 3, 1993, the U.S. and Swiss Governments ex-
changed diplomatic notes that expanded the scope of available assistance between
the SEC and Swiss authorities.2 84 Pursuant to the notes, the SEC may now use
information obtained in Switzerland under the Swiss Treaty as evidence in civil
and administrative proceedings involving a wide array of securities-related of-
fenses. The new notes provide that, where assistance is granted under the Swiss
Treaty in criminal matters, it also is granted in connection with SEC investigations
and proceedings involving "offenses in connection with the offer, purchase or
sale of securities such as trading of securities by persons in possession of material
non-public information. 2 85 Essentially, the 1993 exchange of notes will ensure
that information the SEC receives from the Swiss in the course of a noninsider
trading investigation may also be used by the SEC as evidence in proceedings
that the SEC initiates.
b. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Switzerland
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Ancillary Administrative
Proceedings, Executed November 10, 1987286 (1987 Swiss MOU)
Concurrent with the exchange of diplomatic notes in 1987, the United States
and Switzerland reaffirmed, in the 1987 Swiss MOU, their interest in providing
mutual assistance in criminal matters and ancillary administrative proceedings.
This understanding was intended to help avoid or minimize conflicts arising from
the exercise of jurisdiction in law enforcement matters. In the 1987 Swiss MOU,
both governments undertook to communicate and consult when necessary; to
inform each other when seeking evidence in the territory of the other in a criminal
284. Int'l Series Release No. 626 (Dec. 28, 1993).
285. Id.
286. 27 I.L.M. 480.
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matter arguably within the scope of agreements such as the Swiss Treaty; to use
best efforts in avoiding unilateral compulsory measures; to consult with each other
prior to using compulsory measures; and to exercise moderation and restraint in
using unilateral compulsory measures. The 1987 Swiss MOU also reaffirmed
the parties' intentions to provide mutual assistance in combating organized crime.
Moreover both parties agreed that the Swiss Treaty procedure should be used
as a first resort whenever available and to the extent possible, and that the United
States and Switzerland would use their best efforts to improve the practical avail-
ability and effectiveness of the Swiss Treaty and other instruments.
The 1987 Swiss MOU further evidences the progress the United States and
Switzerland have made in providing mutual assistance to each other.
B. TREATY ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF THE
NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES2 87 (NETHERLANDS TREATY)
Unlike the Swiss Treaty, the Netherlands Treaty does not have a list of applica-
ble offenses, and generally does not require dual criminality. The assistance to
be provided under the Netherlands Treaty includes locating persons, serving
judicial documents, providing records, taking testimony, producing documents,
and executing requests for search and seizure. Assistance may be refused for
political offenses or where execution of the request "would prejudice the security
or other essential public interests" of the requested state. Evidence and informa-
tion obtained under the Netherlands Treaty may not be used "for purposes other
than those stated in the request," but this use restriction may be waived with
the prior consent of the executing state.
In the last few years, the Netherlands has passed legislation such as prohibiting
fraudulent practices in the sale and trading of securities that will provide the
basis for the granting of assistance in securities cases.
C. TREATY ON EXTRADITION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF
TURKEY288 (TURKISH TREATY)
The Turkish Treaty applies to all offenses that fall within the jurisdiction of
judicial authorities of the requesting state. The Turkish Treaty provides assistance
in locating persons; serving judicial documents; effecting the taking of testimony,
the production of documents, and the service of process; and compelling the
appearance of witnesses before a court of the requesting state. Assistance may
be refused for political or military offenses or where the executing state considers
that execution of the request "is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, or
287. Done June 12, 1981, U.S.-Neth., T.I.A.S. No. 10,734 (entered into force on Sept. 15,
1983).
288. Done June 7, 1979, U.S.-Turk., T.I.A.S. No. 9891.
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other similar essential interests." Use of materials obtained under the Turkish
Treaty is limited to the purposes of investigations, criminal proceedings, and
damage claims concerning the offense that is the subject of the proceeding or
investigation in the requesting state.
D. TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC ON
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS289 (ITALIAN TREATY)
The Italian Treaty provides for mutual assistance in criminal investigations
and. proceedings concerning a broad range of offenses. Significantly, persons
not in custody in the requested state may be required by the requested state,
pursuant to a request, to appear there for testimony if the requesting state certifies
the testimony is relevant and material.
E. TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
290
(CANADIAN TREATY)
The Canadian Treaty provides for mutual legal assistance in all matters relating
to the investigation, prosecution, and suppression of criminal offenses. The treaty
does not require dual criminality, and specifically provides for assistance regard-
ing securities offenses under Canadian provincial law or U.S. law. The assistance
includes locating persons or objects, serving documents, taking testimony, pro-
viding documents and records, and executing requests for searches and seizures.
Importantly, the Canadian Treaty has virtually no limitations on the use of evi-
dence obtained through its processes.
F. TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND CONCERNING THE CAYMAN
ISLANDS RELATING TO MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS29 1 (CAYMAN ISLANDS TREATY)
The Cayman Islands Treaty offers cooperation and mutual legal assistance in
criminal investigations and prosecutions that involve offenses punishable by more
than one year of imprisonment under the laws of either the United States or the
Cayman Islands. The treaty also authorizes cooperation regarding specific crimes,
including insider trading, fraudulent securities practices, racketeering, and failure
to report international currency transfers or financial transactions in connection
with any criminal offense covered by the Treaty. The Cayman Islands Treaty
289. Entered into force on Nov. 13, 1985, S. EXEC. 98-25, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
290. Mar. 17, 1985, U.S.-Can., 24 I.L.M. 1092 (U.S. Senate advice and consent received
Oct. 24, 1989; entered into force Jan. 24, 1990).
291. July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K., 26 I.L.M. 536 (U.S. Senate advice and consent received Oct. 24,
1989; entered into force Mar. 19, 1990).
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includes the following mutual assistance: the taking of testimony; provision of
documents, records, and articles of evidence; serving of documents; locating of
persons; and immobilizing of criminally obtained assets. The Cayman Islands,
it should be noted, are a British Crown colony.
The Cayman Islands Treaty contains several limitations on assistance. For
example, assistance will not extend to conduct not punishable by imprisonment
of more than one year. Assistance may be denied when the request does not
establish reasonable grounds for believing that the specified criminal offense has
been committed, or when execution of the request is contrary to the public interest
of the requested party.
G. TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
THE BAHAMAS ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
2 92
(BAHAMIAN TREATY)
The Bahamian Treaty provides a full range of mutual legal assistance in crimi-
nal, civil, and administrative investigations and prosecutions that involve conduct
punishable as a crime under the laws of both the United States and the Bahamas,
or under the laws of the requesting state by one year's imprisonment or more,
provided that it arises from certain enumerated activity, including fraud and
violations of the law relating to financial transactions. Assistance available in-
cludes the taking of testimony; provision of documents, records, and articles of
evidence; serving of documents; locating of persons; exchanging of information;
and immobilization of forfeitable documents. Assistance may be denied when
the request would prejudice the security or public interests of the requested state,
when the request relates to a political offense, or when the request does not
establish reasonable grounds for believing that the specified criminal offense has
been committed.
II. Memoranda of Understanding, Communiques, and Other
Arrangements between the SEC and Foreign Governments
or Authorities
In the early 1980s, when assertions of foreign secrecy laws frustrated SEC
attempts to secure foreign-based evidence in several notorious insider trading
cases, the SEC resorted to the federal courts to compel the production of the
foreign-based information. That unilateral approach, however, was time consum-
ing and expensive and strained international relations. Partly because of the SEC's
success in U.S. courts, the Commission was able to begin a dialogue with foreign
securities officials and other law enforcement authorities to develop informal
case-by-case understandings that facilitated the production of foreign-based infor-
292. June 12-Aug. 18, 1987, U.S.-Bah., S. Doc. No. 17, 100th Cong. (U.S. Senate advice and
consent received Oct. 24, 1989; entered into force July 18, 1990).
WINTER 1995
796 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
mation. The ad hoc nature of that approach highlighted the need for more formal
mechanisms that would provide greater assurance of assistance and foster cooper-
ation. As a result, the SEC began focusing on using existing bilateral and multilat-
eral agreements to satisfy its information needs. In some cases, the SEC found
that because those mechanisms were not specifically tailored to its investigation
and litigation needs, the existing agreements provided inadequate assistance.
Accordingly, the SEC initiated discussions for its own formal understandings.
The SEC has signed fourteen memoranda of understanding (MOUs) for the
sharing of information and for facilitating cooperation in SEC and foreign author-
ity investigations and judicial proceedings. MOUs provide the SEC with direct
access to information held by a counterpart in a foreign country. The memoranda
formalize methods for requesting and providing information in connection with
SEC and foreign authority efforts to administer and enforce their respective
securities laws. Whereas treaties require a lengthy negotiation process and ratifi-
cation, MOUs take less time to negotiate and do not require ratification. MOUs
generally are nonbinding arrangements between like-minded regulators and are
intended to facilitate mutual assistance in a variety of matters. Unlike some of
the bilateral MLATs, the SEC's MOUs do not require the subject matter of the
request to involve offenses under the laws of both countries. MOUs are a prag-
matic approach to obtaining information and assistance, and requests usually are
processed expeditiously. The SEC currently is negotiating additional MOUs with
other countries and intends to build on existing MOUs to further strengthen its
enforcement and regulatory capabilities.
The SEC also has signed more limited communiqu6s with foreign authorities.
Although less comprehensive than MOUs, communiqu6s similarly provide a
framework for cooperation between the SEC and its foreign counterparts, and
some are intended to be interim arrangements pending the signing of a comprehen-
sive MOU. In other situations in which an MOU or communiqu6 might not have
been appropriate, but the SEC decided to formalize a relationship, the SEC has
issued joint statements with foreign authorities.
In the last few years, the SEC has provided technical assistance to emerging
securities markets and has entered into understandings to facilitate such technical
assistance and, in some cases, to facilitate obtaining of information for regulatory
and enforcement purposes. The SEC's MOUs with Argentina and Mexico also
contain technical assistance provisions.
A. MOUs
1. MOU between the United States and Switzerland293 (Swiss MOU)
On August 31, 1982, the governments of Switzerland and the United States
signed the Swiss MOU to establish mutually acceptable means for addressing
293. Int'l Series Release No. 2, 43 SEC Docket 141 (Aug. 31, 1982).
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the problems of insider trading. The Swiss MOU was necessary because insider
trading was not specifically a violation of Swiss law; therefore, the Swiss Treaty
was not always available for such cases. The Swiss MOU, however, recognized
the continued availability of the Swiss Treaty for insider trading litigation and
investigations.
The Swiss MOU mandated the establishment of a provisional arrangement in
the form of a separate private agreement among members of the Swiss Bankers'
Association (SBA), who trade on U.S. securities markets under the aegis of the
SBA, to provide the SEC with assistance. That agreement, known as Convention
XVI, provided that, under certain circumstances, the signatory banks may disclose
and furnish information to the SEC, working through the FOPM, without violating
Swiss bank secrecy laws. 294 Convention XVI was terminated on July 1, 1988,
when the Swiss insider trading law went into effect, although the agreement
remained in effect until December 31, 1988. Although the Swiss MOU no longer
is in effect, the authors believe that the understanding was extremely effective
and that the SEC learned much from the experience. The Swiss MOU can be
used as a model for developing future relationships with foreign jurisdictions
and for future MOUs.
Pursuant to Convention XVI, requests for assistance under the Swiss MOU
were sent to a three-member commission of inquiry appointed by the SBA. The
Swiss commission examined each request and determined whether the request
met certain basic thresholds, and presented sufficiently suspect circumstances.
Convention XVI provided that its procedures would be available if within twenty-
five trading days prior to a public announcement of a proposed merger, consolida-
tion, sale of substantially all of an issuer's assets, or other similar business combi-
nation (business combination) or the proposed acquisition of at least 10 percent
of the securities of an issuer by open market purchase, tender offer, or otherwise
(acquisition), a customer gave to a bank an order to be executed in the U.S.
securities markets for the purchase or sale of securities, call options, or put
options for securities of any company that was a party to a business combination
or the subject of an acquisition.
Upon receipt of a request from the Swiss commission, the bank would freeze
the relevant customer's accounts up to the amount of the profit realized in the
transaction, would inform the customer, and would give the customer an opportu-
nity to respond to the allegations contained in the request. Within forty-five days,
the bank would forward the requested report to the Swiss commission. The Swiss
commission then would forward the report to the FOPM for transmission to the
SEC. However, if the customer independently established, or the bank's report
established, to the reasonable satisfaction of the Swiss commission, that the cus-
294. To implement Convention XVI, Swiss banks sought provisional waivers of the secrecy laws
from their customers that allowed disclosure of a customer's name where the conditions of Convention
XVI were met.
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tomer did not make the purchases or sales that were the subject of the SEC's
request, or if the Swiss commission determined that the customer was not an
insider under a definition provided in Convention XVI, the FOPM would not
transmit the report to the SEC.
Convention XVI defined an insider as (i) a member of the board, an officer,
an auditor, or a mandated person of the company, or an assistant to any of them;
or (ii) a member of a public authority or a public officer who, in the execution
of his or her public duty, received information about the company; or (iii) a person
who, on the basis of information about an acquisition or a business combination
received from a person described in (i) or (ii) above, was able to act for the latter
or to benefit himself or herself from inside information.
The Swiss commission itself also submitted a report to the SEC. After delivery
of the Swiss commission's report to the SEC and after either a resolution of
the SEC's underlying dispute with the customer, or termination of the SEC's
investigation of the customer, the blocked funds and accrued interest would be
released.
The Swiss MOU provided that information gained pursuant to Convention
XVI could be used only by the SEC and the Department of Justice and would
not be disclosed "to any other administrative body in the United States or to the
public, except to the extent necessary for administrative or judicial purposes of
the specific case."
An insider trading action brought by the SEC illustrates the usefulness of the
Swiss MOU. In SEC v. Harvey Katz, Marcel Katz, Elie Mordo, & Fred Aizen295
the SEC alleged that Marcel Katz, in the course of his employment as an analyst
at Lazard Fr~res & Co., obtained material, nonpublic information relating to a
proposed merger between RCA Corporation and General Electric Company. The
complaint filed by the SEC further alleged that Marcel Katz subsequently dis-
closed this information to his father, Harvey Katz, and that Harvey Katz in turn
disclosed this information to Elie Mordo, who resided abroad, and to Fred Aizen,
Harvey Katz's stockbroker. Mordo then purchased 100,000 shares of RCA stock
through a Swiss bank, Union Bank of Switzerland.
In settling the action, Harvey Katz consented to an injunction and agreed to
disgorge $1,035,425 and to pay a civil penalty of $2,111,168 pursuant to the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA). Under the ITSA, Marcel Katz
agreed to pay a civil penalty of $173,891, Mordo consented to disgorge
$1,087,532, and Aizen consented to pay $60,000 and a civil penalty of $20,000.
The SEC used the Swiss MOU and Convention XVI to identify Mordo as the
purchaser of RCA common stock through the Geneva office of Union Bank of
Switzerland. The SEC's request was reviewed by the SBA, the Swiss Federal
Court (Swiss Supreme Court) and the Swiss Federal Council, all of which affirmed
295. No. 86 Civ. 6088 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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the SEC's right to obtain the evidence sought. During those deliberations, the
profits that Mordo later surrendered in the U.S. civil action were frozen. This
was the first civil action filed by the SEC that used the procedures developed
pursuant to the Swiss MOU.
Convention XVI of the SBA was unique. The assistance available through it,
and the mechanism for obtaining that information, was tailored specifically to
the securities enforcement issue the agreement was designed to address: insider
trading. While Convention XVI was limited to certain types of insider trading
and provided only narrow assistance, the agreement worked both conceptually
and in practice. Because the convention had express standards, it could be applied
fairly and quickly. Also, because the agreement was applied by a Swiss commis-
sion that was sensitive to both the needs of the SEC and the privacy concerns
.of bank customers, it could produce a balanced view of the evidence. This balance
reduced the ability of either party to abuse the process. The approach applied
in Convention XVI thus provides a useful model for future agreements.
Switzerland's Insider Trading Law296 went into effect on July 1, 1988. Prior
to July 1, insider trading could have been punishable in certain circumstances
as an unlawful use of business secrets in violation of article 162 of the Swiss
Penal Code. The new law expands the situations for which insider trading is
prosecuted, and appears to cover the full range of circumstances for which insider
trading is unlawful in the United States. The insider trading law makes unlawful
the use, for personal gain, of confidential information about the issuance of new
securities, mergers, or other matters of comparable significance, by persons
acting in their capacity as directors, officers, or agents of companies, or as
government officials or civil servants, or their assistants, and by tippees of such
persons. The law requires disclosure of confidential information that could have
a foreseeable and significant effect on the price of the subject securities or options
on such securities.
2. Memorandum of the SEC and the Securities Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance of Japan on the Sharing of Information297
(Japanese Memorandum)
On May 23, 1986, the SEC signed a memorandum with the Securities Bureau
of the Japan Ministry of Finance concerning the exchange of information relating
to securities regulation and enforcement. In the Japanese Memorandum each
agency agreed to facilitate the other's "respective requests for surveillance and
investigatory information on a case-by-case basis." The Japanese Memorandum
designates a specific contact person in each agency to enhance regular communica-
tion and processing of requests. The Japanese Ministry of Finance and the SEC
announced, in a January 12, 1989, press release, that to enhance further the
296. CODE PENAL art. 161 (Switz.).
297. Int'l Series Release No. 5, 43 SEC Docket 184 (May 23, 1986).
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implementation of their Memorandum and "to ensure the coordination of market
oversight and enforcement of both U.S. and Japanese securities laws, the parties
agreed to establish a working group to provide a forum for discussion on a regular
basis." 298 Although the Japanese Memorandum is far less specific than other
MOUs, the SEC has been able to obtain information under the Memorandum.
3. MOU between the SEC and the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC),
Commission des Valeurs Mobili~res du Quebec (QSC) and the British
Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC)299 (Canadian MOU)
The Canadian MOU, signed on January 7, 1988, was the first of a new genera-
tion of MOUs signed by the SEC. Like the agreements with The Netherlands
and France and the SEC's most recent MOUs, discussed below, the Canadian
MOU is one of the most comprehensive MOUs or agreements signed by the SEC
to date. It exceeded the scope of cooperation and the subject matter covered in
the Swiss MOU and the 1986 UK MOU (discussed below). The Canadian MOU
reflects the signatories' determination to foster mutual assistance, and because
it is a third generation understanding, the authors believe that the SEC benefited
from its experience with earlier MOUs.
The Canadian MOU is one of the most significant developments in a history
of informal cooperation, including providing mutual assistance in investigations
among its signatory securities regulatory authorities. The Canadian MOU pro-
vides that assistance will be available in cases involving (i) insider trading;
(ii) misrepresentation or the use of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative prac-
tices in connection with the offer, purchase, or sale of any security; (iii) the
duties of persons to comply with periodic reporting requirements or requirements
relating to changes in corporate control; (iv) the duties of persons, issuers, or
investment businesses to make full and fair disclosure of information relevant
to investors; (v) the duties of investment businesses and securities processing
businesses pertaining to both their financial, operational, or other requirements
and their duties of fair dealing in the offer and sale of securities and the execution
of transactions; and (vi) the financial and other qualifications of those engaged
in, or in control of issuers, investment businesses, or securities processing busi-
nesses.
Requests for assistance must allege that a requesting authority is investigating
a possible violation of its laws relating to the subjects listed above. When the
required allegations are made, the other authority will provide assistance in ob-
taining information located within the foreign jurisdiction.
The Canadian MOU provides that the parties will provide each other with the
fullest mutual assistance possible for investigations, litigation, or prosecution of
cases where information needed by one authority is located in the territory of
298. SEC News Release 89-3.
299. Int'l Series Release No. 6, 43 SEC Docket 186 (Jan. 7, 1988).
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the other. Assistance available under the Canadian MOU includes (i) providing
access to information in official agency files; (ii) taking the evidence (testimony)
of persons; and (iii) obtaining documents from persons. The SEC, OSC, and the
BCSC exchanged letters in conjunction with the signing of the Canadian MOU
in which they undertook to seek express authority to conduct investigations on
behalf of a foreign securities regulatory authority absent an independent violation
of domestic law (the QSC already had that authority). The OSC, 3°° QSC, BCSC,
and SEC now all have such legislative authority.
Enforcement efforts aimed at cross-border securities violations historically
required voluntary cooperation of witnesses or the initiation of costly and often
time-consuming litigation. The authorities were unable to compel witnesses lo-
cated in the territory of the other authority to testify or produce documents. Under
the Canadian MOU, the securities regulators agree to investigate, using subpoena
power where necessary, on behalf of one another, to ensure that the necessary
information is obtained.
The Canadian MOU contemplates that testimony will be taken pursuant to the
laws of the responding authority. When an MOU is used to gather evidence for
trial, such a procedure will, in all likelihood, not affect its admissibility. °1 Issues
of privilege, however, such as the application of the Fifth Amendment, are re-
served for consideration by the courts of the responding country. In cases where
evidence already has been gathered by one of the Canadian authorities for its
own purposes, whether a United States privilege could be asserted to exclude
its use by the SEC is questionable. 0 2
The United States and Canada historically have taken different approaches to
protecting an individual's right against self-incrimination during compelled testi-
mony. Those differences may affect the ability of U.S. criminal authorities to use
testimony obtained by the SEC in Canada under the MOU. In Canada, a witness
must testify, even if testifying would incriminate the witness. The witness has the
right, however, not to have incriminating evidence obtained in one proceeding used
in any other proceeding. In the United States, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides a witness with protection from self-incrimination, but, if the
witness testifies, that testimony can be made available to, and used by, federal pros-
ecutors (U.S. attorneys) and state prosecutors. Thus, Canadian law would give the
SEC access to a greater range of information, which it could use for its own civil
investigations and proceedings or for assisting in a criminal proceeding against
300. In 1994 the government of Ontario amended part VI, section 11(1), of the Ontario Securities
Act to provide the OSC explicit authority to "by order, appoint one or more persons to make such
investigation with respect to a matter as it considers expedient ... (b) to assist in the due administration
of the securities laws or the regulation of the capital markets in another jurisdiction."
301. See United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988) (depositions taken pursuant to
French procedures admissible as evidence at trial).
302. See United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (illegally obtained wiretap
evidence gathered by Canadian police deemed admissible in U.S. criminal proceeding).
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another person, than it normally would have under U.S. law. Ironically, the infor-
mation could not be used in a criminal matter against the declarant.303 The state of
Canadian law on this point is discussed in more detail below.
Section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) provides
that "[a] witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any
incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any other
proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory
evidence. -304 This right acts as a counterbalance to long-standing Canadian law
that a witness cannot refuse to answer questions on grounds of self-
incrimination. 30 5 Thus, persons compelled to give information under section
128(1) of the Securities Act of British Columbia 30 6 cannot refuse to answer ques-
tions.3 °7 In proceedings in criminal and penal matters, however, any person
charged with an offense has the right "not to be compelled to be a witness in
proceedings against that person in respect of the offence.
30 8
The right of a witness in Canada who testifies in a proceeding not to have
incriminating evidence used against that witness in any other proceeding is nar-
row. That right only attaches to the declarant, does not restrict the use of informa-
tion obtained derivatively from testimony, and apparently does not prevent the
use of the testimony to impeach the witness in other proceedings. In Kuldip v.
The Queen3°9 the Canadian Supreme Court held that testimony given at a criminal
trial may be used to impeach the accused on cross-examination at a retrial on
the same charges in order to undermine the witness's credibility, although not
to prove or disprove the truth of the earlier statement. It is possible, therefore,
that compelled testimony in a securities investigation may be admissible for im-
peachment purposes in a criminal matter. Moreover, the court in Branch & Levitte
held that section 128(1) of the Securities Act of British Columbia does not violate
the Charter just because evidence derived from a witness's compelled testimony
may be used against the witness in other proceedings.310
Like most SEC MOUs, the Canadian MOU provides that the contents of re-
quests for assistance, the information gathered in response to such requests, and
any other matters arising during the operation of the MOU will be held in confi-
303. The MOU provides that a requesting authority may use information obtained under the MOU
for "assisting in a criminal prosecution." See supra note 299, art. 6, para. 1(b). The MOU also
recognizes, however, that its signatories "may not in all circumstances possess the legal authority
to provide the assistance contemplated" in the MOU, id. art. 2, para. 3, and that a requested authority
may deny assistance "on grounds of public interest." Id. art. 3, para. 4.
304. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) § 13.
305. See Evidence Act, R.S.C. § 5 (Can.); Evidence Act, R.S.C. § 4 (B.C.).
306. Securities Act, R.S.B.C. § 128(1) (1985).
307. See British Columbia Sec. Comm'n v. Branch & Levitte, 43 B.C.L.R.2d 286 (1990), aff'd
sub nom. Branch & Levitte, Vancouver Registry #CAO12166 (C.A. B.C. Jan. 30, 1992), appeal
dismissed, file no. 22978 (Can. Apr. 13, 1995).
308. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)
§ 1 (c).
309. 3 S.C.R. 618 (1990).
310. Branch & Levitte, supra note 307.
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dence by the securities authorities. The Canadian MOU requires each regulatory
authority to take active steps to preserve that confidentiality with respect to third
parties. The MOU provides that when the requesting authority has terminated
its investigation, it will return all nonpublic documents received from another
securities regulator under the Canadian MOU.
The Canadian MOU has been an effective tool for obtaining and providing mu-
tual assistance. For example, the MOU played an important role in two related
actions filed by the SEC in 1993. In the first action, SEC v. Ramon D 'Onofrio,3 11
the SEC alleged that the defendants manipulated the price of the stock of Kinesis,
Inc., on the U.S. over-the-counter market, creating the appearance of an active
market for Kinesis stock by employing fraudulent and deceptive devices. The de-
fendants included the promoters, their investment banking firms, the transfer
agent, one broker-dealer, and four registered securities sales representatives.
Among the fifteen defendants against whom the SEC obtained final judgments of
permanent injunction were two Canadian nationals who were directors of Griffin-
Hayhurst Ltd., a securities boiler room located in Marbella, Spain, and the Cana-
dian registered representative who serviced the D'Onofrio nominee accounts used
to effect the alleged prearranged manipulative trades. Griffin-Hayhurst sold
Kinesis stock to investors in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Australia." 2 In the
second action, SEC v. Edifice America Corp., the SEC alleged that the defendants
participated in a fraudulent and deceptive scheme in which the defendants attempted
to induce investments in Edifice America Corporation by a U.S. insurance com-
pany and through U.K. financial institutions and a Swiss investment banker.314
Finally, in connection with the entry of consent injunctions in SEC v. OEX,
Inc. , the SEC acknowledged the assistance of the BCSC as being instrumental
in its investigation and prosecution.316 In that action, the SEC alleged that the defen-
311. No. 93 Civ. 2628, SVW(Ex) (C.D. Cal., filed May 5, 1993); Litigation Release No. 13627
(May 6, 1993). The district court issued final judgments of permanent injunction against 15 of the
16 defendants in the action. The SEC dismissed the complaint as to one registered representative
who consented to the entry of a cease and desist order by the SEC. Pursuant to default judgments,
the court ordered Ramon D'Onofrio to surrender $700,000 and Joseph Garofalo $200,000 of ill-gotten
gains from the manipulation. Litigation Release No. 13987 (Mar. 1, 1994).
312. In a related matter, a Canadian national who concealed his Kinesis shareholdings in a Baha-
mian Bank, and his Delaware holding company, consented to an order barring them from violating
the beneficial ownership provisions of federal securities laws. In the Matter of Bernard C. Sherman
and Shermfin Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34738 (July 14, 1994).
313. No. 93 Civ. 2629, SVW (CTx) (C.D. Cal., filed May 5, 1993), Litigation Release No.
13628 (May 6, 1993). The district court issued final judgments of permanent injunction against
Edifice, Mark D'Onofrio, a D'Onofrio investment banking company, and a Canadian national.
Litigation Release No. 13988 (Mar. 1, 1994).
314. In both the D'Onofrio and Edifice matters, the SEC also received substantial assistance from
the Central Office of Police of the Principality of Andorra, the Ministerio de Economfa y Hacienda
of the Kingdom of Spain, and Her Majesty's Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry
of the United Kingdom. The assistance included the compulsion of testimony and the production of
bank records and other documents.
315. No. 88 Civ. 2076 (W.D. Ark.), Litigation Release No. 11975 (Jan. 25, 1989).
316. Id.
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dants engaged in the fraudulent sale of stock in two Arkansas private companies
and a public shell company traded on the Vancouver Stock Exchange. In a matter
related to the SEC's action against OEX, Inc., the BCSC issued a cease trade order
against the securities of Electromagnetic, Inc., and ordered certain individuals to
resign as directors or officers of reporting issuers and not to resume such offices
for a period of time.317 During the BCSC proceeding that resulted in the BCSC
orders, the BCSC admitted into evidence the deposition transcripts of several peo-
ple from the U.S. action against OEX, Inc. The individuals ordered to resign as
officers and directors appealed the BCSC decision, arguing, among other things,
that the deposition transcripts were inadmissible because these people did not have
a right to cross-examination and thus were denied a fair hearing. The British Colum-
bia Court of Appeal rejected that challenge and held that admission of the deposition
transcripts did not constitute a breach of fundamental justice.318
4. MOU between the SEC and the Brazilian Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios
(CVM)319 (Brazilian MOU)
On July 1, 1988, the SEC signed an MOU with the Brazilian Comissao de
Valores Mobiliarios, the SEC's counterpart in Brazil. The Brazilian MOU is
identical in almost every respect to the Canadian MOU, but differs in that it
contains additional language making explicit the parties' intention to use the MOU
mechanism to conduct compliance inspections of investment businesses such as
brokers and investment companies that engage in business in both jurisdictions.
5. Agreement between the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in the Exchange of Information in
Securities Matters and the Establishment of a Framework for Consultations
between the SEC and the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands
(Netherlands Agreement);32 ° and the Communiqui Regarding the
Implementation of the Netherlands Agreement and the Establishment of a
Framework for Consultations between the SEC and the Ministry of Finance
of the Netherlands32' (Netherlands Communiqui)
On December 11, 1989, the SEC and the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands
(MOF), on behalf of their respective governments, signed the Netherlands
Agreement, which provides the same type of comprehensive assistance in securi-
ties matters as the Brazilian and Canadian MOUs. The comprehensive assistance
provisions of the Netherlands Agreement similarly are implemented for the SEC
by the amendments contained in section 6 of the Insider Trading and Securities
317. In the Matter of O.E.X. Electromagnetic Inc., No. CA01 1910 (C.A. B.C. May 23, 1990).
318. Id.
319. Int'l Series Release No. 7, 43 SEC Docket 206 (July 1, 1988).
320. Int'l Series Release No. 115, 45 SEC Docket 715 (Jan. 12, 1990).
321. Int'l Series Release No. 406, 51 SEC Docket 1876 (July 1, 1992).
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Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).322 Unlike the SEC's earlier MOUs,
the Netherlands Agreement is a binding agreement under international law as
opposed to a statement of intent to cooperate. This form of agreement ensures
that in The Netherlands, where the securities regulatory process is in a developing
stage, the full powers of the Dutch Government are available to execute requests
for assistance. The Netherlands Agreement provides that the SEC and the Dutch
competent authorities will provide each other with the greatest possible measure
of administrative assistance in obtaining and exchanging information relating to
investigations of possible securities law violations. Accordingly, the Netherlands
Agreement expressly provides that mutual cooperation in criminal matters be-
tween the parties will continue to be governed exclusively by the Netherlands
Treaty.323 On May 19 and 22, 1992, pursuant to article 11 of the Agreement,
the parties made the necessary notifications that they had complied with the
procedures constitutionally required for the entry into force of the Agreement
in the United States and The Netherlands.
The SEC Chairman and the Minister of Finance for The Netherlands signed the
Netherlands Communiqu6 on July 1, 1992, the date the Netherlands Agreement
entered into force. The Netherlands Communiqu6 states, among other things,
the mutual intentions of the parties to engage in consultations about subjects of
mutual interest to protect investors by ensuring the efficiency and integrity of
the securities markets of the United States and The Netherlands. The Netherlands
Communiqu6 is similar in form to the French Understanding. 324 The signatories
to the Netherlands Communiqu6 expressed their desire to enhance communication
between the SEC and the securities authorities of The Netherlands. The Nether-
lands Communiqu6 contemplates consultations that will assist in developing "mu-
tually agreeable approaches for strengthening the securities markets of the United
States and the Kingdom of The Netherlands, and will help avoid conflicts that
may arise from the application of differing regulatory practices."
6. Administrative Agreement between the SEC and the Commission des
Opgrations de Bourse of France (COB) (French Agreement);3 25
Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Framework for
Consultations between the SEC and the COB326 (French Understanding)
On December 14, 1989, the SEC and its French counterpart, the COB, signed
the French Agreement, which is similar to the Netherlands Agreement both in
its comprehensive scope and in its status as a binding agreement. The French
Agreement provides that the SEC and the COB may utilize their respective com-
322. See infra notes 368-71 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
324. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
325. Int'l Series Release No. 117, 45 SEC Docket 726 (Jan. 12, 1990).
326. Int'l Series Release No. 116, 45 SEC Docket 724 (Jan. 12, 1990).
WINTER 1995
806 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
pulsory powers to assist each other in matters within the scope of the MOU, as
authorized, respectively, by ITSFEA and by the French Law of August 2, 1989,
which expanded the powers of the COB and gave it the authority to gather informa-
tion on behalf of foreign securities authorities.
Contemporaneously with the signing of the French Agreement, the SEC and
the COB signed the French Understanding, which goes beyond the provisions
of the French Agreement and represents a significant new step in international
cooperation in securities matters. In the Understanding, the SEC and the COB
recognize that the interdependence of the U.S. and French securities markets
makes essential the establishment of a framework, in addition to the mutual
assistance provisions of the French Agreement, to enhance communication about
all matters relating to the operation of the securities markets of their respective
countries. The Understanding reflects the agreement between the SEC and the
COB to engage in mutual consultations about subjects of common interest to
coordinate market oversight and to resolve differences that may exist between
their respective regulatory systems. The French Understanding is the first formal
understanding between the SEC and a foreign securities authority regarding mat-
ters beyond the enforcement of the securities laws. It provides a framework for
the two authorities to take active steps to address a wide range of issues concerning
the stability and integrity of the U.S. and French securities markets.
The French Agreement entered into force on January 31, 1991, upon an ex-
change of letters in which the SEC and COB notified each other that each had
taken all domestic measures necessary to implement the agreement. For the United
States, that involved the enactment of the International Securities Enforcement
Cooperation Act327 and ITSFEA, which are discussed below. Six months after
the SEC and COB entered into the French Agreement, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) signed an almost identical agreement regarding
mutual assistance and the exchange of information.328
7. MOU between the SEC and the Comisi6n Nacional de Valores of Mexico
(CNV) on Consultation, Technical Assistance, and Mutual Assistance for
the Exchange of Information319 (Mexican MOU)
The SEC signed an MOU with the CNV on October 18, 1990. The Mexican
MOU is broad in scope and encompasses assistance in enforcement matters, the
provision of technical assistance, and consultations about all matters relating to the
operation of the securities markets in the United States and Mexico. Its provisions
regarding assistance in securities enforcement matters are similar to those con-
tained in the Canadian and Brazilian MOUs. The Mexican MOU recognizes that
each authority may not have the legal authority to provide all forms of assistance
contemplated in the MOU. To the extent an authority lacks legal powers to provide
327. See infra notes 373-76 and accompanying text.
328. See CFTC Release No. 325/-90 (June 6, 1990).
329. Int'l Series Release No. 181, 47 SEC Docket 1128 (Oct. 22, 1990).
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the assistance requested, each authority agrees to seek to obtain such authority or
to seek the assistance of other governmental agencies that do have such authority.
The Mexican MOU also states that the CNV and SEC intend to begin negotia-
tions, subject to the fulfillment of necessary internal procedures, with a view
toward signing a binding agreement.
8. MOU between the SEC and the Norway Banking, Insurance & Securities
Commission (BISC) Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the
Administration and Enforcement of Securities Laws3 30 (Norwegian MOU)
The Norwegian MOU, signed on September 24, 1991, provides for consultation
and mutual assistance in the administration and enforcement of U.S. and Norwe-
gian securities laws. It formalizes the intent of the SEC and the BISC to cooperate
and to provide assistance in the full range of securities matters, not just enforce-
ment matters. It also provides a framework for consultations concerning the
operation of the MOU and matters of mutual interest regarding the countries'
respective securities markets.
The Norwegian MOU is particularly significant because it provides for an
enhanced level of cooperation in the execution of requests for assistance. A
representative of the requesting authority "may prescribe specific questions" to
be asked of a witness during testimony taken in the country of the requested
authority and, subject to approval by the requested authority, "may be present
at the taking of testimony." A representative of the requesting authority "may
be present at the inspection or examination" of the books and records of, among
other things, an investment business and, subject to approval by the requested
authority, "may participate in that inspection or examination." The requesting
authority may submit to the responding authority a request "that a person or
persons designated by the requesting Authority be permitted to conduct the testi-
mony of any person, or conduct an inspection or examination." Finally, where
the responding authority grants a request that specifies that the laws of the state
of the requesting authority require the opportunity for counsel for the witness
or any party to the proceeding to pose questions to the witness, "the requested
authority will use its best efforts to ensure that such an opportunity will be given."
9. MOU on Exchange of Information between the SEC and the CFTC and the
U.K. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Securities and
Investments Board (SIB) on Matters Relating to Securities33' (UK MOU)
On September 25, 1991, the SEC, the CFTC, the DTI,332 and the SIB signed an
expanded MOU. The UK MOU supersedes an MOU that was signed in 1986 (1986
330. Int'l Series Release No. 321, 49 SEC Docket 1747 (Sept. 30, 1991).
331. Int'l Series Release No. 323, 49 SEC Docket 1767 (Sept. 30, 1991).
332. See infra note 541 and accompaning text. The DTI was the SEC's counterpart for federal
regulation of the securities markets in the United Kingdom. The Financial Services Act (FSA), which
was passed by Parliament in 1986, gave the DTI increased responsibility for the oversight and
enforcement of British securities laws. In June 1992 the functions and staff of the DTI's Financial
Services Division were transferred to H.M. Treasury.
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UK MOU).333 The 1986 UK MOU was viewed as an interim arrangement because,
at the time, none of the signatories could compel information on behalf of the other
foreign regulator, and because of the 1986 UK MOU's limited scope (for example,
assistance was limited primarily to providing market information). The DTI later
obtained the power to assist overseas regulatory authorities by compelling the testi-
mony of witnesses and the production of documents. That power is parallel to
that acquired by the SEC pursuant to section 21(a)(2) of the Exchange Act. The
1991 UK MOU, among other things, accounts for this additional authority.
The UK MOU makes assistance available in virtually all types of cases that
could arise under the securities and futures laws of the United States and the
United Kingdom. 335 Assistance will be available in the following areas: violations
of laws regarding the disclosure obligations that arise from the acquisition of
shares in companies; fraud or manipulation in connection with the offer, purchase,
or sale of securities, futures, and options (including foreign futures and options
products); and the failure of persons and entities to make fair and accurate reports
to regulatory authorities.
The UK MOU contemplates that the signatories will use all available authority
to provide assistance to each other, including: providing access to information
in files; questioning or taking the testimony of designated persons; obtaining
specified information and documents from persons; conducting compliance in-
spections or examinations of investment businesses; and permitting the represen-
tatives of the requesting authority to participate in the conduct of the inquiries
made by the requested authority. The parties agreed to use subpoena authority
where necessary to obtain the information requested by another party.
The UK MOU expresses each signatory's intention to gather information upon
request regarding all matters relating to possible violations of the requesting
authority's securities laws or regulations, using subpoena powers, if necessary.
Such assistance includes providing access to agency files, taking testimony and
obtaining information and documents from persons, and conducting compliance
inspections or examinations of investment businesses. Assistance will be provided
without regard to whether the subject matter of the request constitutes a violation
of the requested authority's laws or regulations. The UK MOU also contains
333. Int'l Series Release No. 4, 43 SEC Docket 176 (Sept. 23, 1986).
334. Companies Act, 1989, § 82 (Eng.).
335. On August 15, 1988, the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASD, the
Chicago Board of Options Exchange, Inc., and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) entered
into an MOU with the U.K. SIB, the Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers, the Financial
Intermediaries Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association, the Investment Management Regula-
tory Organization, the Securities Association Limited, and the Bank of England (Financial Regulation
MOU). The Financial Regulation MOU provides that, upon request, U.S. authorities will make
available to U.K. authorities certain information concerning the capital position of broker-dealers.
By making this information available, the Financial Regulation MOU allows U.K. regulators to
"disapply" their capital adequacy rules in relation to U.S.-regulated broker-dealers that conduct
business in the United Kingdom.
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provisions that enable the SEC to participate in the taking of testimony and
conducting inspections. Like all the SEC MOUs, the UK MOU contemplates
the confidentiality of information exchanged thereunder, and that the parties will
protect the information from unnecessary public disclosure.
On May 1, 1995, the SEC and the Investment Management Regulatory Organisa-
tion (IMRO) (the U.K.'s self-regulating body for the fund management industry)
signed, within the framework of the UK MOU, a Declaration on Cooperation and
Supervision of Cross-Border Investment Management Activity (Declaration).336
The Declaration will facilitate the SEC's ability, pursuant to the UK MOU, to in-
spect the records of U.K.-based investment advisors registered with the SEC. The
Declaration likewise will facilitate IMRO's ability to inspect records of U. S. -based
investment advisors registered with IMRO. The Declaration is the first formal ar-
rangement for the supervision of cross-border fund management activity, which
is an increasingly significant portion of the securities industry in both countries. 
337
Several actions brought by the SEC illustrate the usefulness of the UK MOU.
In SEC v. Collier3 38 the SEC filed a complaint, pursuant to which both defendants
consented to, and the court ordered, injunctions under section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act and Rule lOb-5 thereunder.339 The complaint alleged that defendant
Geoffrey Collier misappropriated information from his employer, a British invest-
ment bank, and purchased securities on the London Stock Exchange through
accounts in the United States. Collier allegedly made the purchases through defen-
dant Michael Cassell, a director and registered representative of an American
broker-dealer.
This case is significant because it alleged violations of U. S. securities laws based
on information misappropriated in a foreign country, and on insider trading con-
ducted on a foreign securities exchange. The SEC alleged that conduct significant
to the violation occurred in the United States, including trading through a U.S.
broker in an attempt to avoid detection in Great Britain, and the allegedly unlawful
scheme involving Cassell, who was associated with a U.S. broker-dealer. Under
the conduct test applied by many U.S. courts, this activity constituted a sufficient
jurisdictional basis for the court to exercise jurisdiction over this matter.
In In the Matter of European American Corp. (Euramco)34° the SEC temporarily
336. Int'l Series Release No. 806, 59 SEC Docket 698 (May 3, 1995).
337. In a related development, on July 17, 1995, the SEC and the SIB announced a joint initiative
to conduct in-depth studies of the financial, operational, and management controls used by selected
securities firms that conduct significant cross-border derivatives activities. The initiative represents
the first international regulatory effort, involving all the relevant securities and banking regulators,
to analyze the management controls necessary to manage risk across a financial services group's
foreign and domestic affiliates. See SEC News Release 95-131; SECand SIB Announce Joint Initiative
to Improve Oversight of Global Securities Firms, FIN. TIMES, July 18, 1995, at 4.
338. No. 88 Civ. 4505 (C.D Cal. July 26, 1988), Litigation Release No. 11817 (July 26, 1988).
339. Upon filing this action, the SEC acknowledged the valuable assistance of the DTI, pursuant
to the 1986 UK MOU, during the investigation leading to the filing of its action.
340. Exchange Act Release No. 26881 (June 1, 1989).
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suspended trading in the securities of Euramco because of questions raised about
the adequacy and accuracy of publicly disseminated information concerning,
among other things, Euramco's business activities, operations, acquisition, and
valuation of assets, and whether Euramco had reporting obligations under section
12 of the Exchange Act. The SEC publicly acknowledged the assistance received
from the SIB in this matter pursuant to the 1986 MOU.
In a related matter, the SIB initiated a legal action in the United Kingdom
against a Swiss broker, Pantell S.A., which sold Euramco securities.34" ' After
the requested relief was granted, Euramco filed an action in a U.S. federal court,
European American Corp. v. Securities & Investments Board, 42 alleging that
the SIB wrongfully interfered with Euramco's contractual relationships by causing
the company to default on a contract to acquire a gold mine in Panama; converting
its property by freezing funds that properly belonged to Euramco rather than
Pantell; disseminating false and misleading information concerning Euramco; and
conspiring to deprive Euramco of its constitutional rights. In a friend-of-the-court
brief, the SEC supported the SIB's ultimately successful motion to dismiss the
action on grounds of sovereign immunity, citing the SIB's authority to promulgate
rules and regulations for investment business in the United Kingdom, and to
investigate, to discipline, and to initiate civil and criminal actions in the United
Kingdom to enforce U.K. laws.343
10, MOU between the SEC and the Comisi6n Nacional de Valores of
Argentina on Consultation, Technical Assistance, and Mutual Assistance
for the Exchange of Information3" (Argentine MOU)
The Argentine MOU, signed on December 9, 1991, provides for consultation
and mutual assistance in the administration and enforcement of U.S. and Argen-
tine securities laws. The Argentine MOU also provides for consultations between
the signatories on all matters relating to the operation of the securities markets
of their respective countries, and on the operation of the Argentine MOU. In
addition, like the Mexican MOU, the Argentine MOU contains provisions for
technical assistance.
11. MOU between the SEC and the Comisi6n Nacional del Mercado de
Valores of Spain Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the
Administration and Enforcement of Securities Laws345 (Spanish MOU)
The Spanish MOU, signed on July 8, 1992, provides for consultation and
mutual assistance in the administration and enforcement of U.S. and Spanish
341. Securities & Inv. Bd. v. Pantell, S.A., [1990] Ch. 426, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 698 (Eng. 1989,
reported in THE TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 1989.
342. No. 89 Civ. 2333-JGP (D.D.C.), Int'l Series Release No. 120 (Apr. 5, 1990).
343. See SEC Press Release No. 90-19, Memorandum Opinion, European Am. Corp., Inc. v.
Securities & Inv. Bd., No. 89 Civ. 2333 (MB) (D.D.C. July 11, 1991).
344. Int'l Series Release No. 354, 50 SEC Docket 0878 (Dec. 18, 1991).
345. Int'l Series Release No. 429, 51 SEC Docket 2838 (July 30, 1992).
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securities laws. The Spanish MOU also provides for consultations between the
signatories on all matters relating to the operation of the securities markets of
their respective countries, and on the operation of the Spanish MOU.
12. Understanding between the SEC and the Commissione Nazionale per le
Societ e La Borsa (CONSOB) of Italy3 (Italian MOU)
The Italian MOU, initialed in Milan in November 1992 and signed on May
5, 1993, was designed to facilitate the exchange of information between the SEC
and the CONSOB, the Italian securities regulator. The Italian MOU is similar
in scope and subject matter to the MOUs with-Brazil, Canada, The Netherlands,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. The CONSOB has a limited ability to compel
information from persons or entities not regulated by the CONSOB. The CON-
SOB, however, is able to compel information from any person or entity involved
in suspected insider trading or market manipulation.
47
13. Understanding between the SEC and the Superintendencia de Valores y
Seguros (SVS) of Chile348 (Chilean MOU)
The Chilean MOU, signed on June 3, 1993, unlike some of the SEC's other
comprehensive MOUs, does not provide specifically that a requesting authority
may be present at the taking of testimony or statements . 34 The authors do not
believe, however, that this will affect negatively or substantively the quality of
assistance provided to the SEC by the SVS. The Chilean MOU provides that the
requesting authority may prescribe questions both before and during the taking
of testimony.
14. MOU Concerning Consultation and Cooperation in the Administration
and Enforcement of U.S. and Australian Securities Laws, between
the SEC and the Australian Securities Commission (ASC)"5°
(Australian MOU)
The Australian MOU, signed on October 20, 1993, differs from other compre-
hensive MOUs recently signed by the SEC"' in that the Attorney General of
Australia (AAG) plays a major role in the implementation of the Australian MOU.
Clause 1, paragraph l(a) of the Australian MOU states that the "ASC's ability
to exercise coercive powers on behalf of foreign regulators is governed by the
Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act 1992" (MABRA).332 Under
346. Int'l Series Release No. 547, 54 SEC Docket 0357 (May 18, 1993).
347. Italian Law 157/1991.
348. Int'l Series Release No. 548, 54 SEC Docket 737 (June 3, 1993).
349. Compare, e.g., Spanish MOU cl. 3, § 4, 4, supra note 345, with Chilean MOU art. III,
§ 4, 1 5, supra note 348.
350. Int'l Series Release No. 599, 55 SEC Docket 0841 (Oct. 20, 1993).
351. See, e.g., Norwegian MOU, supra note 330; Spanish MOU, supra note 345; Argentine
MOU, supra note 344; and Chilean MOU, supra note 348.
352. Supra note 350.
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MABRA's provisions, the compelling of testimony on behalf of the SEC requires
an affirmative action by the AAG, in consultation with the ASC. An SEC request
for assistance under the Australian MOU, however, is considered by the AAG
pursuant to section 8 of MABRA, which provides standards consistent with the
MOU.
Pursuant to part 2, section 6.(2)(a) of MABRA, compelled statements obtained
by the ASC for foreign regulators cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceed-
ings against the declarant or in proceedings against the declarant for the imposition
of a penalty. The statements can be used for all other purposes, including as a
basis for seeking derivative evidence against the declarant or as evidence against
a third party. The SEC can use compelled testimony as part of its investigation,
and hence has access to information that otherwise is beyond its reach at the
investigative stage. If civil or administrative proceedings seeking a penalty com-
mence, the SEC has available other means for obtaining the same testimony in
a form that can be used in the proceeding. Moreover, if the testimony is essential
to the SEC's case against the declarant, the SEC can use it in an injunctive or
administrative proceeding, but cannot seek a penalty in such a proceeding.
B. COMMUNIQU9S CREATING FRAMEWORKS FOR COOPERATION
1. Trilateral Communiqui on Cooperation between the SEC, the U.K. DTI
and SIB, and the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of Japan353
On September 21, 1990, the SEC and securities regulators from the United
Kingdom and Japan issued a communiqu6 in which the signatories stated their:
(i) intention to continue to coordinate their efforts to maintain safe and sound
securities markets; (ii) agreement of a need to maintain balance between the
stock and derivative markets to avoid adverse effects on the stability of the stock
markets; (iii) intention to encourage cross-border business between their markets
by pursuing mutual recognition of regulatory systems; (iv) agreement on the
desirability of regularly exchanging information to facilitate the monitoring of
multinational firms with operations in their respective capital markets; (v) inten-
tion to utilize fully their domestic powers to assist each other in the oversight
of their respective domestic markets and the enforcement of their respective
securities laws; and (vi) intention to meet regularly on a trilateral basis to continue
discussions about matters of mutual interest.
2. Communiqui on the Exchange of Information and the Establishment of a
Framework for Cooperation between the SEC and the Swedish Financial
Supervisory Authority (SFSA)354
On June 27, 1991, the SEC signed a Communiqu6 on the Exchange of Informa-
tion and the Establishment of a Framework for Cooperation with the Swedish
353. Int'l Series Release No. 159, 47 SEC Docket 791 (Oct. 1, 1990).
354. Int'l Series Release No. 322, 49 SEC Docket 1764 (Sept. 30, 1991).
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Bank Inspection Board. After signing that communiqud, the Swedish Bank Inspec-
tion Board merged with the Swedish Insurance Inspection Board, and is now
called the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen). On
September 24, 1991, the SEC signed a superseding communiqu6 with the SFSA.
In the communiqu6 the SEC and the SFSA declared their intention to provide
mutual assistance to the fullest extent permitted by the laws or regulations of
their respective jurisdictions. Such assistance is designed to facilitate the perfor-
mance of market oversight functions and the investigation, litigation, or prosecu-
tion of securities matters in both countries. The SEC and the SFSA also declared
their intention to consult and, to the extent legally possible, provide assistance
concerning the surveillance and operation of their securities markets and market
participants. To the extent the SEC or the SFSA lack authority to provide assis-
tance, efforts will be made either to obtain such authority or to seek assistance
from other government agencies authorized to provide the assistance requested.
The communiqu6 also states that the SEC and the SFSA contemplate that, as
an interim understanding, the communiqu6 will serve as a basis for the develop-
ment of a more comprehensive MOU in the future.
3. Communiquis between the SEC and the Financial Services Board of the
Republic of South Africa (FSB) and the Securities Regulation Panel of the
Republic of South Africa (SRP) on the Exchange of Information and the
Establishment of a Framework for Cooperation and Consultation;
Declaration of the SEC and the FSB Concerning the Development of a
Comprehensive MOU on Cooperation Concerning Securities Matters;
Declaration of the SEC and the SRP Concerning the Development of a
Comprehensive MOU on Cooperation Concerning the Regulation of
Takeovers, Mergers, and Insider Trading; and the Declaration of the SEC
and the Office for Banks of the Republic of South Africa (OFB) on
Cooperation Concerning Securities Matters
355
On March 2, 1995, the SEC signed understandings with the FSB, SRP, and
OFB, key South African authorities responsible for overseeing South Africa's
securities markets. These understandings establish a cooperative and consultative
relationship that is fundamental to effective market regulation, oversight of cross-
border offerings, and enhanced enforcement. Like the Swedish communiqu6,
these understandings express the intent of the signatories to provide mutual assis-
tance to the fullest extent legally possible.
The declarations establish a detailed understanding regarding future, compre-
hensive MOUs. The signatories declared their intention that the MOUs would
cover the full range of laws governing the offer, purchase, and sale of securities,
and would contain a mechanism for requesting and obtaining a full range of
355. Int'l Series Release No. 794, 58 SEC Docket 3006 (Apr. 18, 1995).
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investigatory assistance. Moreover, the signatories declared that information pro-
vided under the MOUs would be subject to the confidentiality and use provisions
specified in the MOUs, and that assistance would be granted under the MOUs
without regard to whether the type of conduct described in a request for assistance
would constitute a violation of the laws or regulations of the state of the authority
receiving a request for assistance.
C. JOINT STATEMENTS RELATING TO COOPERATION IN
REGULATORY MATTERS
1. Joint Statement on the Establishment of Improved Cooperation between the
SEC and the Commission of the European Communities35 6
On September 23, 1991, the SEC and the Commission of the European Commu-
nities (EC), now referred to as the European Union (EU),357 issued a joint state-
ment regarding mutual cooperation. In the joint statement, the SEC and the EU
declared their intention to work together to facilitate the exchange of information
and the provision of mutual assistance by the SEC and the relevant national
authorities of the EU Member States regarding the administration and enforcement
of U.S. and EU members' securities laws.
In addition, the SEC and the EU declared their intention to consult regularly on
matters of mutual interest concerning the operation and oversight of the securities
markets in the United States and the EU. The joint statement provides for a
regular dialogue between the SEC and the EU to review developments in securities
markets and to discuss principles underlying securities regulation in the United
States and the EU.
2. Joint Statement Setting Forth an Agenda for Oversight of the
Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Market358
On March 15, 1994, the SEC, the CFTC, and the U.K. SIB issued a joint
statement setting forth an agenda for oversight of the OTC derivatives market.
This first international understanding among securities and futures regulators
for developing and coordinating an approach to the OTC derivatives market
demonstrates the need and ability of regulators to work in a coordinated fashion
to address some of the most complex issues arising in the markets today.
356. Int'l Series Release No. 320, 49 SEC Docket 1746 (Sept. 30, 1991).
357. The entry into force, on November 1, 1993, of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
introduced some changes in terminology regarding the EC and some of its institutions. The EU is
now the umbrella term referring to a three-pillar construction encompassing the EC and the two new
pillars: (1) Common Foreign and Security Policy (including defense); and (2) Justice and Home
Affairs (notably cooperation between police and other authorities on crime, terrorism, and immigration
issues). As before, the EC encompasses all policies such as the single market, derived from the
founding treaties. The term EU, however, is preferred in view of the difficulties of delineating what
is strictly EC or EU business.
358. Int'l Series Release No. 94-17.
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The joint statement identifies ways in which the SEC, the CFTC, and the SIB
can cooperate in their regulatory approaches to the OTC derivatives market and
sets forth several common goals to be achieved by the three authorities. The
seven-point program includes: improving international oversight of OTC deriva-
tives trading through enhanced information sharing; improving risk management
by promoting the use of legally enforceable netting arrangements; addressing
concerns about excess leverage by promoting the establishment of prudent risk-
based capital charges and increased use by firms of stress simulations of severe
market conditions; promoting the development and use of sound management
controls as part of an effort to monitor and control firms' activities and risk;
encouraging strengthened standards for customer protection; examining the regu-
latory framework for multilateral clearing arrangements; and promoting im-
proved standards for accounting recognition, measurement, and disclosure. Fi-
nally, the authorities stated their intent to work actively with other domestic
and international securities, futures and financial regulators to promote wider
regulatory cooperation.
D. TECHNICAL AsSISTANCE
1. Emerging Securities Markets
The SEC has provided information and technical assistance to foreign authori-
ties about securities matters, including the development and regulation of securi-
ties markets. Recent developments in Eastern and Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union have highlighted and focused attention on the critical need of coun-
tries with emerging securities markets. Through several initiatives, the SEC has
redoubled its efforts to address the needs of, and respond to requests for assistance
from, emerging securities markets.
In 1991 the SEC organized and held at its offices in Washington, D.C., the
first International Institute for Securities Market Development to provide training
for foreign government officials responsible for the development or regulation
of emerging securities markets. Subsequent institutes have been held at the SEC
every year.3 59 The faculty of the institutes consists of senior SEC officials, other
senior U.S. government officials, experts from self-regulatory organizations, and
representatives from other international organizations.
In 1994 the SEC held its first International Training Institute: Program of
Enforcement and Market Oversight (Enforcement Institute). The Enforcement
Institute, expected to take place annually, is designed to provide staff of foreign
securities regulators and relevant law enforcement officials with practical training
359. In 1994 more than 80 officials representing 50 countries attended the program including,
for the first time, representatives from Bermuda, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Slovenia, South
Korea, and Uzbekistan. In 1995 approximately 100 delegates from 57 emerging market economies
attended the Institute.
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in the areas of SEC investigative techniques, market surveillance, inspections of
investment companies and advisers, and examinations of broker-dealers. 360 Staff
from the SEC, the NYSE, and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), together with representatives from industry, developed the content of
the Enforcement Institute and participated as speakers.
The SEC also has provided technical assistance to Eastern Europe by sending
SEC staff as advisers to several countries in the region under a program funded
by the U.S. Agency for International Development. In addition, the SEC partici-
pates in several short-term assistance projects for countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean, as well as several countries in other regions.
2. Understandings and Communiques
a. Understanding between the SEC and the Republic of Hungary State
Securities Supervision and the Securities Trading Committee of the
Budapest Stock Exchange Regarding the Provision of Technical




On June 22, 1990, the SEC and Hungarian securities regulators signed an
understanding concerning the provision of technical assistance to Hungary. The
Hungarian Understanding contemplates the training of personnel and the provi-
sion of information and advice relating to the development of systems, mecha-
nisms, and procedures for: order handling, trade recording and comparison;
quotation and transaction data transmission; clearance and settlement; regulatory
requirements relating to market professionals and capital adequacy; accounting
and disclosure; effective market surveillance and enforcement programs; and
investor protection. This assistance is explicitly conditioned upon the availability
of resources and domestic authorizing legislation. The Hungarian Understanding
further contemplates that the parties will communicate reciprocally and cooperate
with each other concerning all matters related to the operation of their markets
and the protection of investors.
b. Understanding between the SEC, the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (UNECLAC)3 62 (IADB and UNECLAC Understanding)
The IADB and UNECLAC Understanding, signed on September 26, 1991, con-
cerns the provision of technical assistance for the development of securities markets
in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is precedent setting in that it provides for
360. In the past, the SEC invited foreign securities regulators to participate in the SEC's Annual
Enforcement Training Program. The Enforcement Institute was started in part because of the unique
interests and needs of foreign authorities.
361. Int'l Series Release No. 129, 46 SEC Docket 1076 (June 27, 1990).
362. Int'l Series Release No. 324, 49 SEC Docket 1780 (Sept. 30, 1991).
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a unique collaboration between the SEC, IADB, and UNECLAC, thus establishing
a mechanism for the SEC to render technical assistance more effectively.
The understanding provides for consultations with the U.S. securities industry
to establish the types of technical assistance needed, including systems for order
handling, trade recording, and quotation and transaction data transmissions, as
well as regulatory requirements pertaining to market professionals, market sur-
veillance, and enforcement. In addition, the signatories undertake to conduct
studies to identify areas in which assistance may be provided, including legal
and accounting infrastructure and methods for strengthening supervisory bodies.
c. Communiqu6 between the SEC and the Costa Rican Comisi6n Nacional de
Valores (CNV) on the Provision of Technical Assistance for the
Development of the Costa Rican Securities Markets, the Exchange of
Information, and the Establishment of a Framework for Cooperation
3 63
On October 10, 1991, the SEC signed a communiqud on technical assistance
and international cooperation with the CNV. The communiqu6 creates a frame-
work for the provision of technical assistance, the exchange of information, and
consultation involving the operation of the securities markets in the United States
and Costa Rica.
In the communiqud, the SEC and the CNV declare their intent to provide
mutual assistance to the fullest extent permitted by the laws or regulations of
their respective jurisdictions. Such assistance is designed to facilitate the perfor-
mance of market oversight functions and the investigation, litigation, or prosecu-
tion of securities matters in both countries. To the extent that either party lacks
authority to provide assistance, efforts will be made to obtain such authority or
to seek assistance from other government agencies authorized to provide the
assistance requested.
The communiqu6 provides for, among other things, technical assistance con-
cerning systems to promote the formation of capital, including both public and
private placement markets; training, clearance, and settlement mechanisms; and
systems for order handling, trade recording, quotation, and transaction data trans-
mission.
d. Understanding between the SEC and the Indonesian Capital Market
Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM) Regarding the Provision of Technical
Assistance for the Development of the Indonesian Securities Markets and
Mutual Cooperation364 (Indonesian Understanding)
Signed on March 24, 1992, this understanding concerns technical assistance
and cooperation with the BAPEPAM, and is the first such understanding with
an emerging market nation in Asia. The Indonesian Understanding resembles
the Hungary Understanding.
363. Int'l Series Release No. 331, 49 SEC Docket 2002 (Oct. 16, 1991).
364. Int'l Series Release No. 376, 51 SEC Docket 183 (Mar. 24, 1992).
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The Indonesian Understanding provides for communication and cooperation
on all matters relating to the operation of the U.S. and Indonesian securities
markets and the protection of investors. Both the SEC and BAPEPAM express
their commitment to use their best efforts to provide mutual assistance to facilitate
the effective administration and enforcement of their respective securities laws
and regulations.
e. MOU between the SEC and the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) Regarding Cooperation, Consultation, and the Provision of
Technical Assistance3 65 (Chinese Understanding)
The Chinese Understanding, designed to formalize a cooperative and consulta-
tive relationship between the SEC and Chinese securities regulatory authorities,
establishes a framework between the SEC and the CSRC to provide technical
assistance for the development of the Chinese securities markets. It also provides
for mutual enforcement assistance relating to activities in U. S. and Chinese securi-
ties markets.
Because Chinese securities laws and regulations are still being formulated and
adopted, the Chinese Understanding does not address certain issues that may be
affected by subsequent legal developments regarding the scope of the CSRC's
powers. In the Chinese Understanding, the authorities undertake expressly to
review its operation on a regular basis and, when new Chinese securities laws
take effect, to consider whether the MOU should be supplemented or superseded.
E. OTHER UNDERSTANDINGS
1. MOU between the SEC and the
Institut Monitaire Luxembourgeois (IML)36
On May 23, 1990, the SEC signed an MOU with the IML that provides for
the exchange of information between the parties relating to trades cleared through
Centrale de Livraison de Valeurs Mobilibres, S.A. Luxembourg (CEDEL) for
the PORTAL trading system. The PORTAL system was designed to handle
secondary trading of certain unregistered securities in transactions exempt from
the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of the Securities Act.367
III. Implementing MOUs
A. COMPELLING THE PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION ACT
The internationalization of U.S. securities markets has created enormous op-
portunities for the SEC to develop new initiatives in the enforcement area. Those
365. Int'l Series Release No. 662, 56 SEC Docket 1981 (Apr. 28, 1994).
366. Int'l Series Release No. 137, 46 SEC Docket 1715 (Aug. 8, 1990).
367. See Exchange Act Release No. 27956 (Apr. 27, 1990); Exchange Act Release No. 33326,
Int'l Series Release No. 622, 1993 WL 527988 (Dec. 13, 1993).
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initiatives are consistent with the SEC's mandate to preserve fair and honest
markets in the United States, and are sensitive to the need for maintaining the
United States as a major securities trading center. For example, as part of its
efforts to assist foreign authorities, the SEC in 1988 proposed, and Congress
enacted, legislation authorizing the SEC to conduct investigations on behalf of
foreign securities authorities, using subpoena authority if necessary. Congress
enacted section 21(a)(2) of the Exchange Act361 (ITSFEA), which empowers the
SEC to conduct a formal investigation upon the request of a foreign securities
authority without regard to whether the facts stated in the request constitute a
violation of U.S. law. On June 21, 1988, a measure similar to the SEC's proposal
was introduced in the Senate, 369 and on June 29, 1988, the SEC's proposal was
introduced in the House of Representatives. 370 Both the House and the Senate
held hearings on the bill, and the Senate Banking Committee favorably reported
out the bill. The House Energy and Commerce Committee reported out the investi-
gatory assistance section of the bill (discussed below). That legislation (Act) was
enacted on October 22, 1988, as section 6 of ITSFEA.
The Act does not require that a matter under investigation on behalf of a
foreign securities authority37 ' also constitute a violation of U.S. law. Because
U.S. securities laws are broader than the securities laws of most other countries,
a "dual criminality" requirement, if applied on a reciprocal basis by other nations,
would tend to limit the applicability of bilateral agreements to a narrow range
of cases and hence limit the SEC's ability to obtain assistance from other nations.
The Act requires that the SEC, in deciding whether to provide the requested
assistance, consider whether the foreign authority has agreed to provide reciprocal
assistance to the SEC. It allows the SEC to refuse to process any request on
grounds that the request violates the public interest. Further, the Act provides
witnesses with all the protection and remedies afforded to witnesses in SEC
proceedings. Accordingly, witnesses could obtain access to a formal order identi-
fying the basis and subject matter of an investigation. Further, a witness could
resist enforcement of an unnecessarily burdensome subpoena. In accordance with
SEC practice, any challenge to an SEC subpoena is reviewable by the SEC as
part of the authorization process for a subpoena enforcement action.
A memorandum submitted in support of the proposed legislation states that
the SEC anticipates that any person resisting the subpoena would make his or
368. Pub. L. No. 100-704, signed into law November 19, 1988.
369. S. 2544, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
370. H.R. 4945, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
371. Section 3(a)(50) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(50) (Supp. 1995), broadly defines
the term "foreign securities authority" to include "any foreign government, or any governmental
body or regulatory organization empowered by a foreign government to administer or enforce its
laws as they relate to securities matters."
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her reasons known at the time he or she initially resists the subpoena.372 This
information would be available to the SEC for its consideration before a decision
was made to institute a subpoena enforcement action. Accordingly, the SEC
would have an opportunity to review the matter and the facts as argued by the
subject of the subpoena, before seeking a court determination. The memorandum
further notes the SEC belief that by providing a witness with the same rights and
protections provided to witnesses in SEC investigations, the proposed legislation
resolves any potential constitutional due process and Fourth Amendment con-
cerns. Because testimony would be taken pursuant to existing investigative proce-
dures, a witness would be entitled to assert all relevant rights and privileges of
the United States. In addition, a witness would be entitled to assert privileges
available in the country seeking the evidence even in cases in which the United
States does not recognize the privileges. Issues of privilege would be preserved
on the record for later consideration by a court of the requesting authority. The
memorandum stated that the SEC anticipates that foreign countries providing
reciprocal assistance to the SEC will follow a similar procedure.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL SECUIUTIEs ENFORCEMENT
COOPERATION ACT OF 1990...
The SEC's 1988 recommendation also contained three provisions that were
approved in 1990 in substantially similar form by the House of Representatives
and the Senate. Those provisions, along with two new provisions, were introduced
as the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1989114 in the
House of Representatives in February 1989, and as the International Securities
Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1989... in the Senate in March 1989. In Decem-
ber 1990, the U.S. Congress enacted the International Securities Enforcement
Cooperation Act (ISECA), that among other things, amended section 24 of the
Exchange Act.376 ISECA has improved substantially the SEC's ability to cooperate
with the securities regulators of other countries.
New subsection 24(d) of the Exchange Act provides a basis for withholding
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of certain records
obtained from a foreign securities authority. This exemption complements ex-
isting exemptions from disclosure under the FOIA. Information obtained from
a foreign securities authority, therefore, that does not satisfy the specific require-
ments of subsection (d) also may be withheld if any other FOIA exemption applies.
372. 134 CONG. REC. S8318-30 (daily ed. June 21, 1988) (submitted by Sen Riegle); Letter from
SEC Chairman Ruder to George Bush, President of the U.S. Senate (attachment A at 12) (June 3,
1988).
373. Pub. L. No. 101-550, 104 Stat. 2713 (1990).
374. H.R. 1396, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
375. S. 646, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
376. 104 Stat. 2713.
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The subsection (d) exemption may be claimed when a foreign securities authority
provided the requested information, and when the foreign securities authority
has in good faith determined and represented to the SEC that disclosure of such
information would violate the laws applicable to the foreign securities authority.
The ISECA clarifies the SEC's authority to provide foreign and domestic
securities authorities with nonpublic information and authorizes the SEC to obtain
reimbursement from a foreign authority for expenses incurred in providing assis-
tance to that authority. Finally, the SEC and self-regulatory organizations may
impose sanctions on a securities professional found by a foreign court or securities
authority to have engaged in illegal or improper conduct.
IV. Cooperation in the Absence of an MOU
A. GERMANY
In a diplomatic note, dated March 22, 1994, the German Ausswdrtiges Amt
(Foreign Office) confirmed that the SEC is qualified to make requests for assis-
tance under the German Gesetz aber die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen
(Law Governing International Legal Assistance in Law Enforcement Matters)
(IRG)."7 The IRG authorizes the Justice Ministry to seek through the relevant
state (Lander) governments, among other things, documents and testimony on
behalf of a foreign law enforcement authority in connection with an investigation.
The confirmation from the Ausswartiges Amt responds to a letter dated Novem-
ber 16, 1993, from the SEC to the German Bundesjustizministerium (Federal
Ministry of Justice). The U.S. Embassy in Bonn delivered the letter to the Auss-
wartiges Amt with a diplomatic note dated November 22, 1993. That letter
explained in detail the competence and functions of the SEC and sought confirma-
tion that the SEC was an agency qualified to seek legal assistance pursuant to
the provisions of the IRG.
This groundbreaking exchange of diplomatic notes established the first offical
mechanism for the SEC to seek legal assistance from Germany for SEC investiga-
tions. German criminal authorities have already provided assistance to the SEC
in several cases under this new mechanism, including witness testimony and the
confiscation of documents. Although the SEC may want to obtain investigatory
assistance in insider trading cases from the newly created Bundesaufsichtsamt
fAr den Wertpapierhandel (Federal Supervisory Office for Securities Trading)
(BAWe),378 where relevant evidence is located in Germany, the SEC may continue
to seek assistance for most of its fraud investigations through the Bundesjustizmin-
isterium.
377. BGBI. I 2071-89 (Dec. 23, 1982) (F.R.G.); Int'l Series Release No. 691.
378. See infra notes 538-41 and accompanying text.
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B. GUERNSEY; SEC v. PACIFIC WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. 379
This case reflects an extraordinary example of international cooperation in
the investigation of serious or complex fraud. Key information for the SEC's
investigation in this matter was obtained pursuant to orders issued on behalf of
the SEC by Her Majesty's Procureur (Guernsey/Channel Islands) pursuant to
the Criminal Justice Law.380 In March 1993, pursuant to orders issued by Her
Majesty's Procureur on behalf of the SEC, the SEC staff took the testimony of
employees of various financial institutions in Guernsey and obtained documents.
The information acquired in Guernsey resulted in, among other things, the discov-
ery of an account in the name of a shell corporation, Dunne Finance, Ltd., at
the Guernsey bank.38'
On April 7, 1993, the SEC filed a complaint in the District Court for the District
of Nevada. 38" The complaint names as defendants Pacific Waste Management, Inc.
(Pacific Waste), a Nevada corporation; Bruno Victor de Vincentiis, a resident of
Vancouver, British Columbia; Bruce C. Simpson, a resident of Perth, Australia;
and John B. Aldred and Fred V. Schiemann, both residents of Reno, Nevada.
Dunne was named as a relief defendant. The complaint alleged that investors were
told that Pacific Waste had the ability and the business purpose to begin immediately
construction, and then operation, of a toxic waste disposal (TWD) plant in the Re-
public of Palau. The SEC staff determined, upon consultation with the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior (DOI) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
government of the Republic of Palau, that the TWD plant was not under construc-
tion, that the documents necessary to obtain DOI or EPA approval to commence
construction had not even been submitted, and that Pacific Waste was a shell corpo-
ration without any valuable assets, income, or substantive business operations. In
addition, false and misleading statements were made to investors regarding Pacific
Waste's alleged acquisition of other companies.
The Nevada district court issued a temporary restraining order that, among
other things, temporarily froze the defendants' assets, enjoined them from selling
the securities of Pacific Waste, and prevented them from violating U.S. securities
laws. On the same day, the court issued an order temporarily sealing the proceed-
ings in the matter (the seal was lifted on April 16, 1993). The court issued a
preliminary injunction on April 26, 1993, and entered a final judgment against
de Vincentiis and Dunne on May 26, 1994.383
379. No. CV-N-93-232-ECR (D. Nev.), Litigation Release No. 13617, Int'l Series Release No.
535 (Apr. 21, 1993) (ancillary proceeding between the SEC and Dunne Finance Ltd., Royal Court
of Guernsey (Ordinary Div.) (Channel Islands).
380. (Fraud Investigation) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 1991.
38 1. For a more detailed description of the SEC's ancillary proceeding against Dunne, see supra
note 225 and accompanying text.
382. Supra note 379.
383. SEC v. Pacific Waste Management, Inc., No. CV-N-93-232-DWH (judgment of permanent
injunction and other relief) (D. Nev. May 26, 1994).
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V. Other Understandings to Facilitate Cooperation
A. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (IOSCO)
IOSCO was established in 1974 as the Inter-American Association of Securities
Commissions and Similar Organizations. In an effort to facilitate discussion
among a broader base of securities regulators, IOSCO expanded its membership
to include regulators from all over the world, and currently has 121 members. 3u
IOSCO provides the major international forum for mutual consultation and collab-
oration about regulatory issues relevant to the development of securities business,
including growing cross-border business. IOSCO aims to facilitate the efforts of
national regulators in ensuring that such business is conducted by adequately
capitalized firms through safe and sound market systems, with investors afforded
proper protection. The SEC has been an active participant in IOSCO since its
inception and currently is a member of its executive committee.
The recent work of IOSCO's Technical Committee concerning enforcement
and the exchange of information is particularly interesting. This work greatly
reinforces the initiatives of the SEC in the international cooperation and enforce-
ment areas. In 1990 the Technical Committee issued a report entitled "Report
Addressing the Difficulties Encountered While Negotiating and Implementing
Memoranda of Understanding.'""' That report was based on a review of responses
of members of the Technical Committee to a comprehensive questionnaire regard-
ing the exchange of information, and on the experience of IOSCO members in
the area of international cooperation. The report identified eight main issues,
such as differences in the regulatory structures of countries, that arise and should
be addressed in the negotiation of MOUs. The report provides a window for
identifying and understanding the differences among the SEC's MOUs and the
MOUs of regulators of other countries.
In 1991 the Technical Committee issued another significant report regarding
MOUs, entitled "Principles For Memoranda of Understanding." The report
endorses a set of principles that can be used in the negotiation and implementation
of MOUs, and reflects the SEC's approach to promoting international cooperation
through the use of regulator-to-regulator MOUs. The principles constitute an
important step toward fulfilling IOSCO's long-held goal of fostering reciprocal
assistance among members in the areas of market oversight and fraud prevention.
The Technical Committee has focused upon specific types of securities law
enforcement scenarios with international implications, and has identified money
laundering as an important issue with broad implications for securities and futures
markets. In particular, at IOSCO's 1992 Annual Conference, the Technical Com-
384. There are 84 full and associate members and 37 affiliate members.
385. A copy of this or other IOSCO reports may be obtained by writing the Secretary General
of IOSCO at: C.P. 171, Tour de la Bourse, 800 Square Victoria, 45e 6tage, Montreal, Quebec H42
1C8, Canada.
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mittee issued a report (which the President's Committee of IOSCO adopted)
addressing how securities regulators can contribute to global efforts to combat
money laundering and how the securities and futures markets can best be protected
against being used to perpetrate money laundering schemes. In preparing this
report, the Committee's working party consulted extensively with members of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which has promulgated recommendations
designed to prevent and detect money laundering activity that would be applicable
to financial regulators and institutions.
Based on the work of the FATF, the working party identified the following
central issues that should be considered in developing tools for combating the
use of the securities and futures markets for money laundering: customer identifi-
cation; record keeping and the ability to reconstruct transactions; detecting and
reporting suspicious transactions; preventing control of securities and futures
firms by criminals; development of programs for intermediaries to guard against
money laundering; use of cash in securities and futures transactions; and coopera-
tion and coordination among domestic and international authorities.
During IOSCO's 14th Annual Conference held in Tokyo in 1994, the Technical
Committee released a report entitled "Report on Issues Raised for Securities and
Futures Regulators by Under-Regulated and Uncooperative Jurisdictions." Part
1 of the report identifies the needs of regulators regarding these jurisdictions and
describes obstacles that may hamper the flow of information. Part 2 describes
the methods used to obtain needed information from these jurisdictions, and Part
3 suggests possible courses of action to improve the present situation.
To address the issues considered in the report, the President's Committee
adopted a resolution, prepared by the Technical Committee, entitled "Resolution
on Commitment to Basic IOSCO Principles of High Standards and Mutual Coop-
eration and Assistance." This resolution asks all members to prepare a written
assessment of their ability to provide mutual assistance and cooperation to foreign
securities and futures regulators. In addition, new members are required to con-
firm that they are willing to comply with IOSCO's principles and that they will
provide assistance in accordance with IOSCO by-laws and resolutions. This reso-
lution clearly states IOSCO's intention to monitor closely the ability of its mem-
bers to obtain assistance from other jurisdictions and to take appropriate steps
to improve the situation.
B. THE COUNCIL OF SECURITIES REGULATORS FOR THE AMERICAS (COSRA)
During a meeting held in Cancun, Mexico, in 1992, securities regulatory
authorities of North, South, and Central America, and the Caribbean, announced
their intention to create a new organization, COSRA, to provide a forum for
mutual cooperation and communication in the Americas and to enhance efforts
of each country in the region to develop and foster the growth of fair and open
securities markets.
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COSRA's charter states that the organization will concentrate its activities
in several areas. These areas will include the proposal and implementation of
regulatory, legal, and structural reforms to facilitate broad-based participation
in the securities markets and to provide a means for privatization, where appro-
priate, of state-owned businesses in the Americas. Further, COSRA will focus
on the integrity of securities markets through coordination of, and cooperation in,
market surveillance and enforcement of the laws and regulations of the countries of
the Americas.386
In June 1993, at their second annual meeting, COSRA members reached an
agreement on important principles for the regulation of secondary markets and
international cooperation in the supervision of investment advisers. Those princi-
ples include transparency in transaction reporting, audit trails, clearance and
settlement, and cross-border surveillance of investment advisers. Each of these
principles is intended to promote and enhance market integrity and investor confi-
dence, while advancing market development and international market consis-
tency.
In June 1994, at their third annual meeting, COSRA members developed and
announced a "Framework for Cooperation in the Americas," in which they
stated their intentions to (i) use the fullest authority possible to assist other COSRA
members in obtaining documents and testimony relevant to any enforcement or
regulatory inquiries being conducted by another COSRA member; (ii) use all
reasonable efforts to obtain the legal authority, if it does not exist, to provide
the assistance contemplated under the framework; and (iii) continuously review
and assess the degree of assistance that can be provided with a view to enhancing
cooperation among the members.
C. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BANKING AND SECURITIES SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITIES OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES ON THE PRINCIPLES FOR
COOPERATION IN AREAS AFFECTING THE SECURITIES MARKET
3 87
(NORDIC AGREEMENT)
On May 31, 1988, the banking and securities regulatory authorities from Den-
mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden entered into an agreement similar
in many respects to the SEC's MOUs with foreign authorities. The signatories
to the Nordic Agreement agreed to cooperate with each other in exchanging
information and records necessary for the supervision of their securities markets.
386. A copy of the COSRA charter, or any other COSRA agreement, resolution, or report,
can be obtained by writing: Superintendent, Department of Internationalization & Development,
Commissdo de Valores Mobilidrios, Rua 7 de Setembro, 111-310o andar, Rio deJaneiro, RJ 20159-900,
Brazil.
387. Done in Copenhagen, May 31, 1988. The signatories included the Finanstilsynet of Denmark;
the Sedlabanki Islands of Iceland; the Bankinspektionen of Sweden; the Bankinspektionen of Finland;
and the Kredittilsynet of Norway.
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The parties also stated their intent "to remove or reduce any obstacles which may
exist to the transfer of information and records" according to the agreement.388
D. COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON INSIDER TRADING
3 89
(COUNCIL CONVENTION)
The Council Convention opened for signature in April 1989. The Council
Convention signals a recognition by signatory countries of the need for interna-
tional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of insider trading as defined
by each signatory. The convention does not establish specific regulatory require-
ments for signatories, but instead sets forth a framework for exchanges of informa-
tion and mutual assistance among the members.
Because its primary purpose is to foster cooperation, the Council Convention's
definition of insider trading is intentionally broad and flexible in order to encom-
pass the various regulatory structures of its signatories. Like the SEC's MOUs,
the convention provides that information is to be gathered in accordance with
the domestic procedures of the country whose assistance is requested, and places
certain limitations upon the permissible uses and disclosure of the information.
VI. The Hague Convention on Evidence Gathering and Letters Rogatory
A. U.S. COURT-ORDERED DISCOVERY UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS390
(HAGUE CONVENTION)
The United States and many other countries are contracting nations to the
Hague Convention. The Hague Convention encompasses three of the most com-
mon devices for foreign discovery: letters rogatory, evidence taking by a consular
official, and private commissioners. The Hague Convention can be utilized only
in connection with judicial proceedings, not investigations, and, therefore, cannot
be used by the SEC in investigations. Moreover, most of the contracting nations
have exercised their prerogative, under article 23 of the Hague Convention, to
refuse to execute letters rogatory for the purpose of pretrial discovery of docu-
ments. Pretrial discovery of testimony may be had if it is relevant to trial, a
difficult burden to meet at the early stages of U.S. litigation, where the evidence
sought may be preliminary and necessary to obtain dispositive proof. For a request
under the Hague Convention to succeed, the specific documents and testimony
being sought may need to be identified, which sometimes is not possible before
obtaining information from the foreign jurisdiction. Several courts have held that
388. Id. at 2.
389. Convention on Insider Trading, opened for signature Apr. 20, 1989, Europ. T.S. No. 130.
390. Opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7,444.
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28 U.S.C. section 1782, 39' the enabling provision for the execution of letters
rogatory in the United States, does not require a pending judicial proceeding;
therefore, a Hague Convention request may be used in connection with an investi-
gation.
Even when the SEC has obtained the evidence requested pursuant to the Hague
Convention, the time and expense expended to obtain the information generally
is substantial. Therefore, the SEC usually defers to the use of bilateral mutual
assistance agreements, MOUs, or in district court proceedings, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Internal foreign restrictions on evidence gathering adopted by all but four of
the contracting states present further obstacles to foreign discovery in securities
cases. The United Kingdom, for instance, has one of the more liberal enabling
provisions under the Hague Convention. This provision, known as the Foreign
Evidence Act, 392 establishes the procedures for execution of letters rogatory pursu-
ant to the Hague Convention. Unlike the U.S. provision for execution of letters
rogatory, the Evidence Act directs U.K. courts executing letters rogatory in civil
matters to narrow discovery, for example, to particular documents,393 and allows
the secretary of state to abrogate cooperation for state security reasons.394
In Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 395 British companies
appealed the execution of letters rogatory in an American contract dispute that
had prompted the institution of a separate U.S. antitrust action. The English
attorney general intervened in the appeal, stating that as a matter of policy the
government opposed cooperation with U.S. antitrust suits. The House of Lords
rejected reference to the antitrust suit as a ground to refuse assistance to discovery
in the contract dispute. The House of Lords refused, however, to give effect to
the routine language used in U.S. discovery that asked for "any memoranda,
correspondence or other documents" relevant to the described documents, be-
cause such language constituted "fishing.
' 396
In the Asbestos Insurance Coverage cases397 the House of Lords considered
the appeal of a decision to execute letters rogatory issued under the Hague Conven-
tion in class action personal injury suits. The U.K. Court of Appeal had authorized
production of categories of documents in part. The House of Lords reversed,
holding that a compendious description of several documents would not meet
the requirement that a document be described with particularity. Secondly, it
held that the party seeking the documents would have to establish that the docu-
391. For a thorough analysis of this provision, see Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782
For Foreign and International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 597 (1990).
392. The Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, ch. 34 (U.K.).
393. Id. § s(4)(b).
394. Id. § s(3)(3).
395. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (Eng.).
396. Id. at 443-44, 463.
397. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 331 (Eng. C.A. 1984) (Fraser, M.R.).
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ments existed and were likely to be in the possession of the person from whom
they were sought.3 98 When the existence of a document is conjectural, production
will be denied. Regarding oral testimony, the House of Lords ordered that if the
witnesses were in a position to give relevant testimony, it would not rule in
advance whether the information sought should be in any way restricted. 399
In In Re State of Norwayo the U.K. House of Lords reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeal4°1 that refused to give effect to letters rogatory issued by
a Norwegian city tax court in connection with a probate proceeding. The Court
of Appeal had held that the Hague Convention could not be utilized because the
Norwegian court proceedings were not "proceedings in any civil or commercial
matter" within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the Foreign Evidence
Act. The House of Lords considered the legislative history of the Foreign Evi-
dence Act and the use of the term "proceedings in any civil or commercial
matter" in other conventions, and concluded that the term should not be given
a restrictive meaning.
The House of Lords noted that if the term "proceedings in any civil or commer-
cial matter" were given a restricted construction, it "would involve a profound
departure from the established legal practice of conferring a very broad jurisdic-
tion upon the courts in the United Kingdom to enable them to provide assistance
for courts in other jurisdictions by obtaining evidence for them."40'
In his opinion, Lord Goff noted that it was difficult to attribute a uniform
meaning or "internationally acceptable definition" to "civil or commercial mat-
ter" in civil law countries. 4'3 He concluded that the term should be construed
by reference to whether the subject proceedings were proceedings in a civil or
commercial matter under the laws of both countries, and noted "that in the
ordinary way the English court should be prepared to accept the statement of
the requesting court that the evidence is required for the purpose of civil proceed-
ings. "44 Under English law, "proceedings in any civil matter should include all
proceedings other than criminal proceedings, and proceedings in any commercial
matter should be treated as falling within proceedings in civil matters."40'
The House of Lords also rejected the contention by the witnesses whose testi-
mony was being sought that the letters of request, or their execution, amounted
to "the enforcement, direct or indirect, of a foreign revenue law." 40 6 Lord Goff
stated that he could not "see any extra-territorial exercise of sovereign authority
398. Id. at 337-38.
399. Id. at 339-40.
400. [1989] 2 W.L.R. 458 (Eng. C.A. 1988) (Goff, M.R.).
401. In re State of Norway's Application (No. 2), [1988] 3 W.L.R. 603.
402. [1989] 2 W.L.R. at 469-70.
403. Id. at 471.
404. Id. at 474.
405, Id. at 475.
406. Id. at 477.
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in seeking the assistance of the courts of this country in obtaining evidence which
will be used for the enforcement of the revenue laws of Norway in Norway
itself."4 7 The House of Lords concluded that the letter of request, which had
been modified during the appeal process, could not be rejected as a "fishing
expedition"; rather, it was "in substance a request for what, by English law,
would be regarded as assistance in obtaining evidence.'408 Lord Goff also ac-
cepted the decision of the Court of Appeal that the letter of request should not
be denied on the ground that it would compel the witnesses to breach their duty
of confidentiality as bankers.
The House of Lords' opinion substantially supports the view that U.K. courts
will consider a proceeding brought by the SEC under the U.S. securities laws
to be a "civil or commercial matter" within the meaning of the Hague Convention,
thus, enabling the SEC to utilize the Hague Convention in the United Kingdom.
In the Santa Fe case, discussed below, the SEC prevailed on this issue when the
British High Court of Justice concluded that an SEC district court proceeding
was a "civil or commercial matter." The second State of Norway Court of Appeal
opinion, however, added some uncertainty to the issue. The House of Lords'
opinion also confirms that requests under the Hague Convention can be drafted
in a manner that avoids their being labelled "fishing expeditions."
B. SEC EXPERIENCE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The following examples illustrate the SEC's mixed results in utilizing the
Hague Convention to obtain information and testimony from several countries.
1. United Kingdom
In SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call
Options for, the Common Stock of Santa Fe International Corporation 4W (Santa
Fe) the SEC applied to the British courts for assistance. It sought documents and
testimony pursuant to the Hague Convention from third-party witnesses resident
in London. Those witnesses included a hotel, a credit card company, and two
individuals who had acted as stockbrokers for purchases of Santa Fe securities
just prior to the announcement that Santa Fe had agreed to merge with Kuwait
Petroleum Corporation. The witnesses had all refused to provide the evidence
voluntarily, on the grounds that without a court order or subpoena they owed a
duty of confidentiality to their customers.
The SEC sought and received letters rogatory in a U.S. court seeking assistance
from England pursuant to the Hague Convention. Upon presentation of this re-
quest, an English master granted the SEC's request and ordered the evidence to
407. Id. at 478.
408. Id. at 479.
409. 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1987).
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be given. Accordingly, the credit card company and hotel produced the documents
sought. The two individuals refused, however, arguing that the SEC's requests
were improper under the terms of the Hague Convention and that if they testified,
they would violate the Luxembourg bank secrecy law because at the time the
purchases were made, they were employees of a London-based Luxembourg
bank.
Seven months later, after extensive briefing and four days of oral argument,
the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, ordered the two individuals
to testify .4 1 0 The court held that the information was relevant, based upon affidavits
submitted by the SEC, and that it was sought for a civil prosecution, as required
by the Foreign Evidence Act. In this respect, the court relied upon the careful
consideration already made by the U.S. judge before issuing the letters. Nor was
it likely the bankers would be prosecuted under the Luxembourg bank secrecy
statute. The court refused to give effect to a foreign privilege with no parallel
in British law. Finally, the court held that British bank secrecy laws would not
apply because, based on the facts of the case, such an application was not in the
public interest. 4 '
2. France
In In the Matter of the Testimony of Costandin Nasser41 2 the SEC used the
Hague Convention to gather evidence for trial from a witness residing in France.
The witness was a close business associate of one of the defendants in Santa Fe.
The SEC had learned that the witness had been with the defendant at or near the
time the defendant traded Santa Fe securities. The witness and the defendant also
had common business associates who were possibly involved in the case, including
a director of the company in whose securities the defendant had traded.
The SEC identified both a business and residence address for the witness in
Paris, France, and requested testimony from the witness relating to his knowledge
of the defendant's activities, securities trading, and business associations. The
SEC initiated the process on June 2, 1983, by motion for issuance of letters of
request under the Hague Convention for assistance from the courts of England
and France. The SEC's motion was granted, sealed by the district court, and
sent to the SEC's attorneys in Paris. The motion was granted by the French
Ministry of Justice on August 26, 1983. Upon granting the motion, the Ministry
of Justice transmitted the request to a civil investigating judge authorized to
gather the requested evidence. On January 18, 1984, the civil investigating judge
convened a hearing on the execution of the request. Attorneys for the SEC and
the defendant appeared at the hearing, but the witness did not appear. Accordingly,
the SEC's French attorney sought imposition of a fine. The judge reserved ruling
410. Reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 511 (1984).
411. Id. The British Santa Fe application for letters rogatory took nine months to complete.
412. Tribunal admin. de Paris, 6 me section-26me chamber, No. 51546/6 (Dec. 17, 1985).
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on this question, stating that he would again have the witness served for a further
hearing.
On March 12, 1984, the witness filed a brief (recours gracieux) with the French
Ministry of Justice protesting the procedure by which his evidence was being
sought, and requesting administrative review of the Ministry of Justice's decision
to transmit the request. Thereafter, on September 26, 1984, the Ministry of
Justice confirmed its initial decision and ordered that the proceedings go forward.
On January 25, 1985, the witness appeared through counsel at a second proceed-
ing, held before the French civil judge. In the interim, however, the witness had
filed a request for review by an administrative court (recours contentieux) against
the initial decision by the Ministry of Justice to transmit the letters of request,
as well as the Ministry's September 26, 1984, confirmation. Since such a request
did not stay the action, counsel for the SEC again sought imposition of a fine
against the witness for his failure to appear. The civil judge again deferred this
decision for consideration until after the administrative court ruled.
On December 17, 1985, the administrative court confirmed the SEC's right
to obtain the evidence sought under the Hague Convention, thus overcoming the
initial hurdle in the request for evidence. In December 1985 the SEC was engaged
in serious settlement negotiations to resolve the Santa Fe case, and the Commis-
sion determined not to pursue the request. Santa Fe was resolved by entry of a
consent injunction on February 26, 1986, almost three years after the letter of
request was issued, and without any compliance under the Hague Convention
by the witness in France.
In SEC v. Fondation Hai41 3 and SEC v. Unifund SAL, 4 14 related insider trading
cases, the SEC used the Hague Convention to seek French telephone records and
testimony and documents from several persons residing in France. The witnesses
included officers of the French company involved in the merger that was the
basis for the insider trading allegations, and other persons residing in France
believed to have information relevant to the litigation.
The court record details the difficulties faced by the SEC in obtaining complete
responses to these Hague Convention requests. 4 5 The May 25, 1990, declaration
describes the proceedings for executing one of the letters rogatory in France.
The witness that testified during that proceeding recommended to one of the
defendants the purchase of the stock of Rorer Group, Inc., prior to the public
announcement of its proposed merger with the French corporation. The witness's
responses were incomplete; when the French magistrate propounded additional
questions to him submitted by the SEC, the witness refused to answer. Although
413. 736 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
414. 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990).
415. See Declaration of Thomas Newkirk, dated May 25, 1990, filed in support of the SEC's
motion to postpone the trial date.
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the French magistrate subsequently ordered the witness to produce the documents
requested by the SEC, the witness refused.
The SEC also sought production of the telephone records of eleven persons
it believed had evidence relevant to its case. This request was the first made by
the SEC under the Hague Convention for telephone records from France. Al-
though the SEC had been told that such telephone records might be available for
certain telephone exchanges in Paris, the French Ministry of Justice informed
the SEC's French counsel that its letters rogatory seeking the telephone informa-
tion would not be transmitted for execution by the French Ministry of Justice.4 16
In SEC v. Arnold Kimmes417 the SEC brought an action against Thomas Quinn,
thirteen other individuals, and two corporations in connection with a large-scale
securities fraud in the marketing and sale of penny stocks. At the time, Quinn
was incarcerated in Paris, France, in connection with an ongoing French criminal
investigation.
On July 17, 1990, a letter of request issued by the district court was filed
with the French central authority. The letter requested the production of certain
documents, including bank records, and testimony. In an order dated November
20, 1990, the French judge refused to execute the letter of request on the grounds
that Rule 11 of the French Criminal Code required that matters relating to French
criminal investigations remained confidential until the case was brought to trial,
that the facts relevant to the civil action before the district court were identical
to those covered by the French judge's criminal investigation in France, and that
a 1984 French bank secrecy law protected certain information from disclosure
in civil actions.
3. Italy
Shortly before the trial in SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana418 (the St. Joe
case, supra) the SEC sought documents and testimony in Italy and Guernsey
pursuant to the Hague Convention. The U.S. district court issued letters rogatory
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy requesting the production of documents
from, and the taking of testimony of, an SEC registered broker-dealer located
in Milan, Italy, and certain individuals affiliated with that broker-dealer. By
decree of the court of appeal of Milan, dated September 10, 1985, the letter
rogatory was authorized and directed to be carried out on October 2, 1985. At
the beginning of the proceedings in the praetor's court of Milan, lawyers for
the witnesses formally objected to the letters rogatory and submitted a legal
memorandum in support of their arguments. The witnesses argued that the pending
action in the United States was not a civil action but an administrative proceeding;
416. See Aug. 24, 1990, Newkirk Affidavit, and Declaration of Thomas C. Newkirk in Support
of Plaintiffs Petition for Rehearing, dated Aug. 24, 1990.
417. 799 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
418. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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therefore, they contended, the letters rogatory did not comply with the Hague
Convention. The praetor concluded that the U.S. proceeding was a civil matter,
as required by the Hague Convention, and ordered the implementation of the
letters rogatory. The witnesses then responded to questions put by the praetor.
The praetor refused to compel the witnesses to produce the requested documents
because the Italian law implementing the Hague Convention does not permit
such compulsion. However, he "invited" the witnesses to produce the requested
documents.
4. Israel
In connection with SEC v. Antar,41 9 as part of its efforts to locate Antar's assets
in 1991, the district court granted the SEC's motion for a request to Israeli
authorities for banking information under the Hague Convention. An Israeli judge
granted the district court's request and ordered the production of documents by
and the taking of testimony from Bank Leumi of Israel. The documents and
testimony obtained as a result of the Israeli judge's order indicated that some of
Antar's money had been transferred to the First National Bank of Israel (FNBI)
and Bank Leumi Trust Company (Leumi Trust). The Israeli judge also issued a
tracing order requiring the production of documents and the taking of testimony
from both FNBI and Leumi Trust. Based on the resulting information, the SEC
determined that Antar had transferred what appeared to be large sums of money
to a Swiss account under the name David Jacob Levi Cohen. At the request of
U.S. officials, in late 1991 Swiss authorities froze an account containing more
than $32 million. Antar retained a Swiss lawyer in a bid to lift the freeze. When
that failed, he personally appeared before Swiss authorities as Cohen and claimed
that the millions in the account had been legally earned through the sale of gem-
stones. The SEC staff realized that "Cohen" was Antar's alias when Swiss
authorities showed the SEC a photograph of Antar (who was posing as Cohen)
from a Brazilian passport used by Antar, but issued in the name of Cohen. That
information contributed to the eighteen-count indictment returned on June 11,
1992, by a Newark federal grand jury and unsealed on June 24, 1992.420 The
419. 831 F. Supp. 380 (D.N.J. 1993).
420. On July 20, 1993, a jury in the criminal case of United States v. Eddie Antar, Crim. No.
92-347 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1993), found Antar guilty on 17 counts of a federal indictment charging
conspiracy to commit securities fraud and mail fraud, securities fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy
to commit racketeering. The jury also found Mitchell Antar (Eddie Antar's brother), a former member
of the office of the president and a director of Crazy Eddie, guilty on six counts. Allen Antar, a
former employee of Crazy Eddie, was acquitted on all counts. On April 12, 1995, a three-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the criminal convictions and
sentences of both Eddie and Mitchell Antar and remanded the case for a new trial before a different
district judge. United States v. Mitchell Antar & Eddie Antar, Nos. 94-5228 & 94-5230, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8083 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 1995). In its ruling, the court said that the presiding district
court judge in the matter had displayed prejudice against both men through a statement he made
during a post-verdict sentencing hearing held in April 1994. The court cited the judge's statement
that it had been his "object" in the case "to get back to the public that which was taken from it as
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discovery of Antar's Swiss bank account through the Hague Convention request
to Israel led not only to Antar's arrest in Israel on June 24, 1992, based on an
extradition request from the United States, but also to the locating and freezing
of over $60 million in accounts controlled by Antar.42" '
C. USE OF LETTERS ROGATORY IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Foreign Utilization of Letters Rogatory Pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1782
U.S. courts have reached different results in interpreting when a foreign request
for assistance pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 may be granted.422 One of the key
issues addressed by the courts considering section 1782 is whether a request can
be made by a foreign government during the investigation stage, or whether a
judicial proceeding must be pending at the time of the request for assistance. In
two recent cases considering this issue, discussed below, the courts held that a
judicial proceeding need not be pending. The Second, Eleventh, and District of
Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals all have agreed it is not necessary that a
proceeding be pending at the time the evidence is sought. The Second and District
of Columbia Circuits have disagreed, however, as to whether the proceeding
must be merely contemplated or whether it must be imminent, and whether a
request for assistance must be made by a tribunal or merely an interested person.
In In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United
Kingdom423 the district court denied a motion to quash an order issued pursuant
to a letter of request from the Crown Prosecution Service in England, which was
conducting an investigation that arose out of a criminal proceeding in England.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's order,
holding that "[p]roceedings in court need not be pending for a foreign prosecutor
a result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant [Eddie Antar] and others." The appeals panel
concluded that this was evidence of impermissible prejudice from the very beginning of the criminal
proceedings.
421. Since Antar's arrest, in addition to the $32 million frozen in accounts controlled by Antar
in Switzerland, authorities in Canada, France, Israel, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom have
cooperated and assisted in either freezing or obtaining information about the location of Antar's
assets in those countries. For example, in early May 1993 the SEC, with the assistance of the
Quebec Securities Commission, succeeded in having over US $1.1 million of Antar's ill-gotten gains
repatriated to the United States for eventual distribution to defrauded investors. See Litigation Release
No. 13649 (May 25, 1993).
422. Section 1782 states, in relevant part, as follows:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him
to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use
in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may be made pursuant
to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or
upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or
statement be given, or the documents or other thing be produced, before a person
appointed by the court.
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988).
423. 683 F. Supp. 841 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, in part, remanded, 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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to obtain assistance as an 'interested person' under section 1782. -424 The court
held it sufficient "that the proceeding in the foreign tribunal and its contours be
in reasonable contemplation when the request is made." 425 The circuit court noted
that courts repeatedly have held that a foreign legal affairs ministry, attorney
general, or other prosecutor "fits squarely within the section 1782 'interested
person' category. "426 The court observed that by amending an earlier version
of section 1782 to delete the word "pending" after "judicial proceeding," the
statute intended "that by making assistance generously available through the
good offices of U.S. officials and courts, our country would set an example
foreign courts and authorities could follow. ' 427 The court explained that the
evidence being sought must be for use in a foreign or international tribunal, and
although it is not necessary that a proceeding be pending at the time of the request,
it is necessary that the evidence "is eventually to be used in such a proceeding,'"
428
and that "judicial proceedings in a tribunal must be within reasonable contempla-
tion. ,429 Noting that "parties involved in judicial proceedings are accorded notice
and an opportunity to participate in the taking of evidence," 430 the circuit court
remanded to the district court with instructions that the evidence be taken in a
form appropriate "for use in a proceeding" in a British court.
In In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad &
Tobago431 the district court similarly denied a motion to quash a subpoena issued
pursuant to section 1782. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the request by the director of public prosecutions of Trinidad
and Tobago in connection with an ongoing criminal investigation was proper,
and that section 1782 did not require that a request be made by a foreign tribunal.
On this issue, the district court noted that to the extent Fonseca v. Blumenthal,
432
discussed below, held otherwise, it disagreed with that holding.433 The circuit
court noted that amendments to section 1782 in 1964 expanded the ability of
U.S. courts to grant assistance, reflecting "a congressional desire to increase
the power of district courts to respond to requests for international assistance."
434
The court stated further that those amendments were intended "to broaden prior
law and permit federal courts to assist bodies of a quasi-judicial or administrative
424. 870 F.2d at 693.
425. Id. at 687.
426. Id. at 690.
427. Id.
428. Id. (quoting Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 1015, 1026 (1965)).
429. Id. at 691.
430. Id. at 693.
431. 648 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 784 (1989).
432. 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980).
433. 648 F. Supp. at 465 n.2.
434. 848 F.2d at 1154.
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nature and foreign investigating magistrates. -4"5 The court concluded that it was
not necessary that a proceeding be pending at the time the evidence was sought.436
In In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo District Court, Tokyo, Japan437 cited
with approval by the Eleventh Circuit in Trinidad & Tobago, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the district court should execute letters rogatory issued in aid of
an ongoing investigation of Japanese income tax laws by the Tokyo District Public
Prosecutor's Office.
In Fonseca v. Blumenthar 38 the Second Circuit held that the requesting author-
ity, the superintendent of exchange control of the Republic of Colombia, was
not a tribunal within the meaning of section 1782. Therefore, it reversed the
district court's order granting the motion to execute letters rogatory. The court,
relying on In re Letters Rogatory (India),43 concluded that the superintendent's
interest in the investigation was "inconsistent with the concept of impartial adjudi-
cation intended by the term 'tribunal.' "440 The court did not address the operative
language of section 1782, relied on by the court in Request for Assistance from
Ministry of Legal Affairs and noted by the court in Request from the Crown
Prosecution Service, that an order may be made "upon the application of any
interested person."
In re International Judicial Assistance for Federative Republic of Brazil v.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.'44 concerns Brazilian authorities' investigation, in
response to press reports, of the alleged embezzlement of over $4 million by
Antonio Gebauer from accounts maintained by six Panamanian corporations at
the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York. According to the press
reports, the accounts were controlled by Brazilian citizens. A Brazilian judge
issued a letter rogatory, ultimately forwarded to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, reciting "that a police investigation was under
way to determine 'possible offenses of tax evasion related to an alleged defalcation
on bank accounts maintained by Brazilian citizens' at Morgan.'," 2 The district
court granted the request and appointed commissioners to execute the letter roga-
tory. One of the commissioners obtained a grand jury subpoena requiring Morgan
to produce documents. The appellants moved to quash the subpoena, contending
that, in the absence of a pending court proceeding, the evidence sought "was
not 'for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,' as [purportedly]
required by . . . [section] 1782."3 The district court upheld the subpoena and
435. Id.
436. Id. at 1155.
437. 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976).
438. 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980).
439. 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967).
440. 620 F.2d at 324.
441. 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
442. Id. at 703.
443. Id.
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the Second Circuit reversed. In contrast to the standard set forth in Crown Prosecu-
tion, the appellate court held that, although section 1782 does not require that
the proceeding be pending, the foreign "adjudicative proceedings [must] be immi-
nent-very likely to occur and very soon to occur" before section 1782 could
be used to collect evidence. 4" The court stated that there was "nothing in the
record to show that adjudicative proceedings are very likely and very soon to
be brought against any particular perpetrators of [the alleged] . . . illicit acts." 445
The court based its holding on the Brazilian prosecutor's identification of four
individuals as targets of the investigation, but referred only to "possible viola-
tions" by those persons and "possible prosecution" of them. Further, the prose-
cutor gave no assessment of the likelihood or timing of formal proceedings against
them.
2. Effect of U.S. Law on Efforts to Assist Foreign Governments
In Young v. United States Department of Justice4 6 the Second Circuit consid-
ered the applicability of the Right to Financial Privacy Act 4  (RFPA) to law
enforcement officials designated commissioners for obtaining evidence for a for-
eign authority. In Young the U.S. Attorney's Office obtained banking information
relating to the appellants and provided it to the attorney general of Bermuda,
who used it to indict the appellants. The Youngs, the appellants, subsequently
pleaded guilty to violations of Bermuda law. The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the Youngs' claim that the U.S. attorney violated
the RFPA by failing to comply with certain notice provisions of that Act. The
court held that the RFPA "does not apply to court-appointed commissioners,
who would otherwise qualify as 'government authorities' under the RFPA, when
they seek information from financial institutions with court-ordered sub-poenas."--8
VII. Private Agreements for Cooperation
As markets begin to overlap in terms of time and the securities they trade, a
logical step for internationalization is the establishment of formal surveillance
sharing agreements (SSAs) between the markets. An SSA is a private agreement
between two securities markets that requires the parties to the SSA to provide
each other with information about market trading activity, clearing activity, and
the identity of the ultimate purchasers of securities. The SSA thus provides a
mechanism that extends the ability of U.S. exchanges to monitor and have access
to surveillance information on products that are trading on a cross-border basis.
444. Id. at 706.
445. Id. at 707.
446. 882 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1989).
447. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988).
448. 882 F.2d at 639.
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Given the speed with which markets move today, and the need for immediate
access to information in the surveillance of those markets, SSAs provide an
important analogue to MOUs. These agreements, originally utilized in connection
with SEC approval of linkages between U.S. and foreign securities exchanges,
are now a particularly important element in the listing and trading of derivative
products. 449 SSAs are in effect today between U.S. exchanges and exchanges in
the United Kingdom, France, Canada, The Netherlands, Hong Kong, Sweden,
Chile, Brazil, Spain, and Japan.
449. See infra notes 505-18 and accompanying text.
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